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Management
ABSTRACT
This dissertation consists of three essays that study operations management prob-
lems of emerging subscription-based business models. The first essay, coauthored with
Pnina Feldman and Ella Segev, investigates the personalized subscription box busi-
ness model where a firm selects and delivers products that are curated to match each
customer’s tastes and preferences. Specifically, this essay investigates how firms may
optimally learn customer tastes, and personalize their offerings in order to maximize
their revenue. Doing so, we investigate the optimal pricing and return policies of a
firm operating with the personalized subscription box business model.
The second essay in this dissertation studies the coordination problem of a two-
sided media streaming platform that aggregates first and third-party content in a
bundle and offer the bundle to users for a subscription fee. Media streaming plat-
forms face a trade-off between maximizing their user base by attracting premium
content providers and the costs due to the outside options of the providers. We study
the effectiveness of platform’s strategic investment in first-party content to attract
premium providers under conventional revenue-allocation mechanisms.
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The third essay in this dissertation studies two-sided media streaming platforms
that offer both first- and third-party content, but strategically steer users to the
first-party content, which is most profitable to the platform. Platforms do so by
manipulating their recommendation systems. In this case the platform may choose to
recommend a content that is different from a user’s optimal preferences. The purpose
of this paper is two-fold. First, we explore the effect of platform’s first-party content
bias on users’ search behavior. Second, we study the effect of users’ search cost and
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Because of consumers growing desire for a convenient and personalized experience,
many incumbents and new entrants in e-commerce and digital goods industry trend
towards a bundling and subscription revenue model. This dissertation focuses on
two such business models: personalized (curated) subscription box services and media
streaming services. The goal of this dissertation is to study the consumer behavior and
the strategic decisions of innovative subscription-based platforms, and examines how
to enhance efficiency and revenues of these business models by providing actionable
operational policy recommendations. To study these models, we employ a variety of
analytical techniques from operations management and economics, including stylized
economic modeling and game theory.
The second chapter studies the personalized (curated) subscription box business
model. In recent years, led by start-ups such as Blue Apron, Trunk Club and Stitch
Fix, personalized subscription services have become increasingly popular amongst
online shoppers. In fact, a survey conducted by McKinsey & Co. shows that 15
percent of online shoppers have signed up for one or more subscriptions to receive
products on a recurring basis1. In a subscription box business model the firm selects




Whereas in a traditional shopping experience a customer chooses the product(s) she
wishes to purchase from an assortment of options, in a personalized subscription box
service, she leaves the selection process to the firm. Therefore, such purchases can
be perceived as riskier by customers. Many subscription services allow customers to
return unwanted items to mitigate this risk. An important mechanism that echoes
the uniqueness of subscription services is learning and personalization. Subscription
services have given an unprecedented ability to firms to learn their customers’ tastes
and tailor their services accordingly.
The third chapter studies the coordination problem of media streaming platforms.
Media streaming services, such as Netflix, Hulu and Amazon Prime Video, aggregate
a large number of content produced by third-party providers and offer unlimited ac-
cess to the bundle to users for a subscription fee. These platforms act as two-sided
content aggregators and benefit from strong indirect network effects. Namely, the
more content on the platform, the more users value and join the service and, in turn,
content providers have higher incentives to join a platform in which they can meet
a wider audience. However, not all content generate the same externalities. The
presence of popular tv-shows (e.g. The office, Friends) or classic movies (e.g. The
Godfather, Singin’ in the Rain) are generally valued more by users than their niche
counterparts. Therefore, providers that own these “popular content” demand to be
compensated for the externalities they create. In short, for these platforms, manag-
ing the supply side of the market - i.e. attracting the “popular content” producers
- can be as crucial as managing the demand side. However, little is known about
the platform’s coordination challenge and the consequences of heterogeneity on the
supply side on the ability of the revenue allocation rules to coordinate the market.
Furthermore, the higher price of popular content has incentivized the streaming plat-
forms to produce their own content. Though creating first-party content has proven
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to be more expensive and riddled with uncertainty than licensing third-party content,
many formerly agrregator streaming platforms including Netflix, Amazon Prime and
Hulu have invested significantly to produce first-party content. Therefore, streaming
platforms have transformed to a hybrid business model, operating as a third-party
content agrregator and a first-party content producer, which further complicates the
coordination problem of these two-sided platforms.
Finally, in the fourth chapter we study the design of personalized recommenda-
tion services of media streaming platforms. Two-sided media streaming platforms
that offer both first- and third-party content may be inclined to strategically steer
users to the first-party content, which is most profitable to the platform. Platforms
do so by manipulating their recommendation systems such that the platform recom-
mends a content different from a user’s optimal preferences. Often the streaming
services such as Netflix carry a large number of content in their library and without
recommendation services, the search may be very costly to users. Therefore, a large
user segment of such platforms rely on the recommendation of engines to choose what
content to consume. For example, according to reports published by Netflix, 75% –
80% of viewer activity on Netflix is influenced by its recommendation algorithm2.
However, users are aware of the platform’s recommendation bias, and consider the
accuracy of recommendations. Therefore, bias may influence users’ optimal search
policy and result in lower willingness to pay.
2How Netflix Uses Analytics To Select Movies, Create Content, and Make Multimillion Dollar
Decisions [Internet]. Available from: https://blog.kissmetrics.com/how-netflix-uses-analytics/.
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2 Summary of Results
2.1 Chapter 2: The Subscription Box Business Model: Learning Tastes
and Product Returns
In this paper, we investigate how a subscription service firm should utilize its opera-
tional levers to learn a strategic customer’s taste and personalize its services to her
preferences. We show the firm faces a trade-off between exploration (learning pref-
erences) by sending risky products versus exploitation (earning revenue) by sending
safe products. We find that depending on the hassle cost of receiving an unwanted
product, it can be optimal for a firm to experiment with its content. Furthermore, we
show that when facing forward-looking customers, a fixed pricing strategy performs
better than a dynamic pricing strategy. The fixed-pricing strategy not only yields
higher expected revenue and allows the firm to experiment with higher hassle costs of
return, but also, maximizes customer acquisition. Finally we show that it is optimal
for the firm to take away all the hassle cost of return, thus making returns hassle-free
for the customer.
2.2 Chapter 3: Coordination of Streaming Platforms in the Presence of
First-Party Content
In this paper, first, we explore the performance of well-established revenue allocation
rules (revenue-sharing and licensing) in coordinating the two-sided platform when
there exists heterogeneity on the supply-side. Second, we suggest a rationale to the
platform’s choice to invest in the risky production of first-party content and the
impact on its ability to attract popular content providers. We show when content
providers are heterogeneous in their popularity amongst users, revenue-sharing does
not coordinate the market. The reason is that the platform is inclined to manipulate
the consumption rate of the popular content to decrease the payment to the popular
providers. However, we show that if the platform commits to charge a subscription
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fee, the revenue-sharing contract can coordinate the market. Furthermore, we find
licensing is able to coordinate the market, because the platform pre-commits to a
payment to the providers before setting the subscription fee. Finally, we find the
platform invests more aggressively in the production of its first-party content, to be
able to attract the popular provider to join the platform.
2.3 Chapter 4: First-Party Bias in Media Streaming Platforms
This paper studies the design of the recommendation system of an streaming plat-
form that has private information about users valuations and provides users with
personalized recommendations. We show depending on the intensity of platform’s
bias to recommend first-party content, users update their belief about their valuation
for alternative content and may choose to continue sampling to find the content that
best matches their tastes. We show a biased recommendation system allows the plat-
form to increase its revenue, albeit at the cost of lower social welfare. We also find
that as the search cost increases the platform is able to steer users toward first-party
content more aggressively. Furthermore, we find that when the search cost is high,
the third-party provider is better off with an intermediate royalty rate.
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Chapter 2
The Subscription Box Business Model:
Learning Tastes and Product Returns
1 Introduction
Recent years have witnessed a substantial increase in the popularity of e-commerce
subscription services. In a subscription box business model, the firm selects and
delivers products curated to match each customer’s tastes and interests, in regular
time intervals. Subscription boxes accounted for approximately $15B in U.S. sales in
2018, and have established a foothold in various categories such as beauty, fashion,
food and home decor1. Notable examples include Birchbox, Trunk Club and Stitchfix.
Whereas in a traditional shopping experience a customer chooses the product(s)
she wishes to purchase from an assortment of options, in a personalized subscrip-
tion box service, she leaves the selection process to the firm. A key challenge for
firms is to learn individual customer tastes and personalize their subscription box
contents, accordingly. Personalization requires deep insight into customer behavior,
which can only be achieved through educated guesses, and repeated interactions with
the customer (Aydin and Ziya, 2009). However, the obvious cost of learning customer
preferences through trial and error is the risk of sending too many unwanted products,
and consequently, losing the customer. In fact, dissatisfaction with assortment is one




To mitigate this risk, most firms offer customer-friendly features such as free ser-
vice cancellation and free returns in the event that a customer receives an unwanted
product2. This paper investigates how firms may optimally learn customer tastes,
and personalize their offerings in order to maximize revenue. Doing so, we investi-
gate the optimal pricing and return policies of a firm operating with the personalized
subscription business model.
In a subscription setting, the firm presents a customer a small subset of their as-
sortment options, observes the customer’s purchasing choice, and reacts accordingly.
In determining the small subset, the firm faces a trade-off. On one hand, offering a
variety of diversified assortment with uncertain values and observing the customer’s
responses facilitates learning the customer’s specific preferences through experimen-
tation. The main advantage of learning is that the firm may adjust its pricing and
assortment choices dynamically to extract more surplus from the customer over time.
On the other hand, extensive (failed) experimentation may result in frequent returns
or customer abandonment, and therefore, compromise the firm’s revenue. Hence, the
firm must also consider the possibility of presenting the customer with a less risky
option, for which the firm is guaranteed to receive some revenue. In short, a sub-
scription firm has two personalization levers: 1) selecting an assortment to present to
a customer; 2) pricing.
In this paper, we investigate how learning customer tastes through experimen-
tation affects a firm’s content and price personalization decisions. Specifically, we
address the following research questions. (1) When should firms attempt to learn
customer tastes through experimentation? (2) How does a customer’s strategic be-
havior affect a firm’s actions? (3) How do a firm’s pricing and return policies affect its
revenue and ability to learn? (4) How does experimentation affect consumer surplus,
2While a few clothing subscription services such as Trunk Club allow customers to preview the
box’s assortment prior to delivery, most firms send the products sight unseen.
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and social welfare?
To address these questions, we examine the interaction between a subscription ser-
vice firm and a single forward-looking strategic customer using a two-period stochastic
game-theoretic model. The firm is in an abundant possession of products from two
distinct categories: “safe” and “risky”. The customer’s preference for products from
the safe category is known to both the firm and the customer. However, the cus-
tomer’s preference for products from the risky category is private information to the
customer, and unknown to the firm. Importantly, we assume that the customer values
a risky product that she likes higher than a safe product. Our model setting is in the
spirit of the seminal two-armed bandit model (e.g., see DeGroot (2005), section 14.5).
Albeit, we tailor the model to account for information asymmetry between the firm
and the customer. Whereas in a typical two-armed bandit model, the principal di-
rectly observes the payoff from pulling an “arm”, in our model, the strategic customer
is the party that observes her value and signals this information to the firm through
her actions. The firm makes content assortment and pricing decisions. Specifically, in
each period, the firm chooses to send a product from either the safe or risky category.
With regards to pricing, the firm may employ one of two policies: the firm may either:
(a) announce the prices for each category at the beginning of each period (dynamic
pricing); or (b) set fixed prices for each category at the beginning of the subscription
(fixed pricing). An important aspect of personalized subscription services, which is
captured in our model, is the hassle cost of returns. The costs of making a return
can be personal hassle costs, or penalties such as return shipping or restocking fees
imposed by the firm. We assume this cost is exogenous. We model the customer’s
purchasing choice such that upon realizing her value for a product she receives, she
may choose to keep it and pay its price, or return the product and incur the hassle
cost of return.
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Our equilibrium analysis of this model yields several important insights and man-
agerial implications. First, we find that under either pricing policy, when the hassle
cost of return is below a certain threshold, the firm engages in experimentation to learn
the customer’s taste. Specifically, the firm sends a risky product to the customer in
period 1 to partially learn her preference for contents from the risky category. Follow-
ing the experimentation phase in period 1, the firm employs behavior-based content
personalization in period 2. Namely, in response to observing that the customer keeps
the product in period 1, the firm sends a risky product in period 2. As the hassle
cost of return increases, the cost of learning outweighs its benefit, and the firm always
sends safe products, and forgoes experimentation. The reason is that if the hassle
cost of return is high, the risky products must be priced relatively low to convince the
customer to join the service. Consequently, the firm’s expected revenue from offering
risky products is low, rendering experimentation futile.
Second, we find fundamental differences between personalization under dynamic
pricing and fixed pricing. We find that when the firm experiments under a dynamic
pricing policy, it exploits both levers of content and price personalization. In period
1, to ensure that a transaction is made (i.e. the customer joins the service), the firm
offers the risky products at a lower price. After period 1’s experiment with sending a
risky product, if the firm believes that the customer is likely to have a favorable taste
for the risky category, then the firm increases the price (i.e. price personalization) and
sends another risky product in period 2 (i.e. content personalization). However, if the
customer returns a risky product, the firm switches to the safe category. This result is
in line with the literature on behavior-based discrimination in repeatedly-purchased
products (Murthi and Sarkar, 2003). Under fixed pricing, however, the firm’s only
lever of personalization is content. We find that under fixed pricing, if the firm chooses
to experiment, it discounts the price of the safe category, but increases the price of the
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risky category. This pricing strategy enables the firm to convince the customer to join
the service, regardless of her preference for risky products. Specifically, a customer
with a distaste for risky products – who would not otherwise join the service under
dynamic pricing – participates in the experimentation phase, anyway, anticipating
that once the firm learns her true preferences, she will receive safe products, but with
a discount. Surprisingly, we find that although dynamic pricing offers two levers of
personalization, the firm is better off with a fixed pricing policy. This is because under
fixed pricing, the customer is guaranteed to join the service and also, the fixed pricing
strategy allows the firm to engage in experimentation for greater values of the hassle
cost of return. Finally, we find that fixed pricing achieves higher total social welfare
since it is not only beneficial for the firm, but is also preferred by the customer.
Finally, we find that it is optimal for the firm to take away all the hassle cost of
return, thus making returns hassle-free for the customer. In practice, most personal-
ized subscription services offer full refunds (100% money-back guarantee) for returns.
Additionally, firms may also adopt different policies that determine how convenient
it is for the customers to return products. Such policies include, but are not limited
to, offering generous time limits, free shipping for returns, free at-home pickups, etc.,
which facilitate customer returns. The benefit of hassle-free returns is twofold. First,
the firm can better extract value from the customer by charging a higher price for
risky products. Second, the firm ensures revenue by guaranteeing that the customer
joins, and a transaction is made. Interestingly, although total social welfare increases
with hassle-free return, we find that customers are worse-off.
2 Literature Review
In this paper, we focus on the design of personalized subscription services, which are
characterized by a firm’s attempt to learn a strategic customer’s taste. Specifically,
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we explore pricing policies and assortment selection, as the firm’s levers for person-
alization. Furthermore, we investigate the firm’s optimal return policies when facing
strategic customers. As such, our paper lies at the intersection of three streams
of research: demand (preference) learning, personalization, and strategic customer
behavior.
The literature on demand learning through assortment planning and pricing poli-
cies is relevant to our work. The studies on assortment planning mostly consider a
homogeneous population of customers with unknown demand. For example, Caro and
Gallien (2007) uses Bayesian inference in a multi-armed bandit context to dynami-
cally learn the demand distributions in a multi-product setting. Rusmevichientong
et al. (2010) studies the assortment planning problem with capacity constraints using
a Multinomial Logit (MNL) model and presents an “explore first and exploit later”
approach. (See Strauss et al. (2018) for a thorough review of assortment optimization
with demand learning.) Closely related to our work is Bernstein et al. (2020) that uses
a stylized model to show that subscription services can employ a “dynamic content
variation” strategy to maximize their demand over a predetermined planning hori-
zon. They find that when customer heterogeneity is low (high) the firm must increase
(decrease) the quality of its content to ensure customer retention (acquisition). There
exists a rich literature on demand learning via price experimentation that utilizes the
multi-armed bandit algorithm to study the trade-off between exploration (demand
learning) and exploitation (revenue earning). Aviv and Vulcano (2012) provides a
survey of works in this area. In a more recent work, Hu et al. (2019) studies the
joint demand learning and pricing problem in a model where consumers can return
the product. Our paper contributes to this literature by introducing a novel learning
model that can be applied to firms that have repeated one-to-one interactions with
their customers.
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A stream of literature in marketing investigates how firms can exploit customers’
personal information for the purpose of personalized pricing (Candogan et al., 2012),
quality discrimination (Li, 2021) and targeted advertising (Shen and Miguel Villas-
Boas, 2018). Prompted by the growing availability of data in online retailing, person-
alized assortment planning and personalized pricing have become an active research
area in revenue management. (See Mǐsić and Perakis (2020) for a comprehensive
review.) The existing literature in this area typically assumes that customers are
price-sensitive myopic shoppers, and designs algorithms that aim to maximize firms’
expected revenue through personalized assortment and pricing. For instance, Bern-
stein et al. (2015) studies a firm with limited inventory that customizes the subset of
products it offers to its customers, based on their preferences. It derives the structural
properties of the optimal policy and proposes heuristics for assortment customization.
Cheung and Simchi-Levi (2017) examines an online personalized assortment optimiza-
tion problem with unknown purchase probabilities and dynamic pricing. It proposes
an algorithm to estimate latent parameters of an MNL choice model, and evaluates
the performance of the algorithm using Bayesian regret. Bernstein et al. (2019) in-
tegrates assortment decisions with online (i.e. real-time) demand learning using a
clustering-based policy. This paper assumes that there exists an unknown number of
clusters of customer profiles, and uses the Dirichlet process mixture model to estimate
the cluster distributions. In a similar approach, Ban and Keskin (2020) uses customer
data to develop an algorithm for dynamic pricing of a single product at an individual
customer level. More closely to our work, Aydin and Ziya (2009) considers the case of
a personalized dynamic pricing scenario, where customers belong to either a high or
low reservation price group. The firm learns its customers’ preferences through signals
they send, which indicate how likely they are to have a high reservation price. Our
work is distinct from the aforementioned studies because we study assortment and
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price personalization in the context of a subscription service, where, essentially, the
firm is the party that governs the customer’s purchasing decision through individual
customer-level content choices. Moreover, we investigate the firm’s operational levers
in the presence of strategic consumer behavior.
There exists a rich literature related to strategic consumer behavior in operations
and revenue management. The impact of strategic consumer behavior on a firm’s op-
erations including inventory-related strategies (Su and Zhang, 2008), product design
(Feldman et al., 2019), and pricing strategies such as dynamic pricing (Cachon and
Swinney, 2009), fixed pricing (Su and Zhang, 2008), and price commitment (Aviv and
Pazgal, 2008), have been extensively studied. Most related to our work are papers
that investigate a firm’s optimal return and pricing policies. Su (2010) studies a dy-
namic pricing problem for repeatedly-purchased products. The paper shows that a
fixed pricing strategy can deter the stockpiling behavior of strategic customers, and
that dynamic pricing should only be used when frequent buyers have a high willing-
ness to pay. Papanastasiou and Savva (2017) considers a setting in which strategic
consumers are allowed to delay their purchases to learn about a product’s quality
through online reviews. It finds that in the presence of social learning, a responsive
(i.e. dynamic) pricing strategy is preferred over a price-commitment pricing strategy
to deter strategic waiting. Altug and Aydinliyim (2016) study a setting in which
strategic consumers are uncertain about their valuations early in the season, and
postpone their purchase to a later period when their uncertainty is resolved, and
price is discounted. It shows that allowing returns with a generous refund could deter
strategic waiting behavior, and induce more sales at a higher price at the beginning of
the season. We contribute to this literature by examining the implications of strate-
gic consumer behavior in a subscription service. We show that in such settings, fixed
pricing with product returns can be a more effective mechanism for learning customer
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preferences than dynamic pricing. This is because a forward-looking and rational cus-
tomer is willing to allow the firm to learn her taste, in exchange for a future discount
on products that better match her taste.
3 Analysis
3.1 Model Description
We study a firm that offers a subscription service to a customer over two periods.
The firm offers two types of product categories, each with zero marginal and fixed
costs. The first type is an established product category, which we refer to as the safe
category. A safe product has known value to the customer, which practically implies
that it is risk-free to both the firm and the customer. The second type is appealing
to some – but not all – customers, which we refer to as the risky category. In other
words, a risky product has uncertain value to the customer and thus, imposes a risk to
both parties. At the beginning of each period, the firm chooses from which category







for the safe and risky products in period 1 and period 2, respectively. We assume
that prices are set dynamically. In other words, the firm sets the price in each period
to maximize profit-to-go.
At the beginning of each period, the customer must choose whether she wishes to
join the service or not; joining (not joining) in the second period implies resuming
(leaving) the service. We assume that the customer can choose to join the service at
no cost and is free to leave the service at any point. At the beginning of each period,
the customer receives a product from one of the two categories. She derives value v
from the product, and opts to keep it and pay price p, or return it and incur a hassle
cost h (0 ≤ h ≤ 1
2
). The hassle cost of return captures the fact that returns can be
inconvenient to a customer for reasons such as traveling to return the product, the
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waiting time to be refunded, or due to shipping costs. If the customer decides to keep
a product of value v at price p, her immediate utility is u(v) = v−p. If she decides to
return the product, her immediate utility is u = −h. We further make the assumption
that the customer keeps the product if she is indifferent between keeping/returning,
and similarly, joins the service if she is indifferent between joining and not joining.
Moreover, the customer is risk neutral with a zero outside option; hence, she joins
the service if her expected utility from joining is non-negative. The customer has a
fixed value of v = 1
2
for all safe products, but is uncertain about her value for risky
products. Specifically, she may like a risky product and realize a value of v = 1 with a
probability of δ, or dislike the product and realize a value of v = 0, with a probability
of 1− δ. In addition, we assume the customer’s valuations for risky products are i.i.d
across periods. While the customer has private knowledge of her δ (i.e., she knows
how often she likes risky products), the provider has no information. Furthermore, we
make the assumption that the customer is strategic with respect to her decision to join
in the first-period or resume in the second period (i.e. she is rational and considers
the future when making her decision to join/resume the service). However, to simplify
the analysis, we assume that the customer is myopic with respect to her decision to
keep/return a product she receives. Therefore, she does not consider period 2 when
making her decision to keep/return a product in period 1; consequently, she keeps a
product in period 1 if and only if her immediate utility from keeping the product is
greater than that of returning the product. Finally, we assume that the firm begins
the service with a prior belief that δ is uniformly distributed on the interval [0, 1].
The timeline of the game is as follows: at the beginning of period 1, the firm
announces the prices for the safe and risky products. The customer observes (ps1, p
r
1)
and decides whether or not to join the service. If the customer chooses to join, the
firm must decide whether to send a product from the safe or risky category. Once
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the customer receives the product, she realizes her value and must decide to keep or
return it. Upon observing the customer’s action, the firm updates its belief about
the customer’s δ. With the updated belief, the firm announces the new prices. The
customer observes the prices and may choose to leave the service, at which point the
game ends. If the customer chooses to stay, the game proceeds into the second period,
and once again, the firm must choose from which category to send a product.
3.2 Dynamic Pricing Equilibrium
We analyze the two-period stochastic game between the firm and the customer using
backward induction. We seek to find a pure-strategy Bayesian perfect equilibrium.
Special Case: Hassle-free Return
Before solving for the general equilibrium, it is useful to start with the firm’s product
and pricing choice in a special case where returns are hassle-free for the customer (i.e.
h = 0). Lemma 2.1 characterizes the perfect Bayesian equilibrium, when h = 0. We
find when returns are hassle-free for the customer, the firm is always better off by
sending a risky product in period 1 and learning the customer’s taste. We present
the proof in the main text because it is simple and motivates our approach to the
general case.
Lemma 2.1. When returns are hassle-free for the customer, the firm’s unique optimal
pricing scheme is such that: pr∗1 = p
r∗







. Moreover, the firm’s
unique optimal product choice is such that:
(i) In period 1, the firm sends a risky product.
(ii) In period 2, the firm sends a risky product if it observes “keep” in period 1, and
sends a safe product if it observes “return” in period 1.
The customer joins the service in period 1, and resumes the service in period 2
regardless of her δ. In both periods, she keeps a product she likes, and returns it,




Proof. Following backward induction, we first examine the customer’s decision in
period 2, when receiving a risky or safe product. The customer keeps the product
if her utility is non-negative and returns it at no cost, otherwise. Therefore, the
customer keeps a risky product in period 2 if v − pr2 ≥ 0, and her expected utility
from receiving a risky product is U2(r) = δ (1− pr2). Recall that δ is the probability
that the customer will like a risky product. Similarly, the customer’s utility from
receiving a safe product is U2(s) =
1
2
− ps2, and she keeps the product if ps2 ≤ 12 . Also,
the customer resumes her service as long as her utility is non-negative, or pr2 ≤ 1 and
ps2 ≤ 12 .
The firm’s optimal pricing strategy in period 2 is as follows: the firm prices a





. Note that ensuring that the
customer resumes the service (i.e. pr2 ≤ 1 and ps2 ≤ 12), the firm’s revenue is strictly
increasing in price. Therefore, it is optimal for the firm to price the product it sends
at the customer’s reservation price. Let us assume that the firm begins period 2 with
the posterior pdf f (·) with support [0, 1]. Then the firm sends a risky product if







sf (s) ds, is
greater than the revenue from sending a safe product, πs2 =
1
2
. Therefore, the firm
sends a risky product if
∫ 1
0
sf (s) ds > 1
2
.
In period 1, similar to period 2, the customer keeps a product if her utility is non-
negative and returns it, otherwise. Moreover, she joins the service if her expected
utility from receiving a product from either categories is non-negative. Therefore,




. Next, we consider the firm’s product choice in period 1. If the firm
sends a risky product in period 1, the customer keeps it if her realized value is 1
and returns it, otherwise. Therefore, according to Bayes rule, upon observing the
customer’s action to keep (Equation 2.1) or return (Equation 2.2) the product, the
firm updates its belief as follows:




f (δ | return) = p (v = 0 | δ) f(δ) dδ∫ 1
0
(1− δ)f(δ) dδ
= 2 (1− δ) (2.2)
The firm’s revenue from sending a risky product in period 2 following a keep









2(1− s)sds = 1
3
)
. Therefore, the firm sends




Second-period subgame: Following backward induction, we first look at the period
2 subgame. In period 2, if the customer receives a safe product, she keeps it if
she gains a higher utility by keeping the product rather than returning it. Recall
that the customer incurs a hassle cost of h should she choose to return the product.
Therefore, the customer keeps a safe product in period 2 if 1
2
−ps2 ≥ −h, which implies
ps2 ≤ 12 +h. In this case, the customer’s utility from receiving a safe product in period
2 is U2(s) =
1
2
− ps2. The utility function implies that the customer resumes the
service if ps2 ≤ 12 . If the customer receives a risky product, she realizes her value upon
observing it, and keeps the product if v−pr2 ≥ −h. Therefore, if pr2 ≤ h, it is too costly
for the customer to return a product she does not like, and will keep the risky product
regardless of her value. In this case, she resumes the service at the end of period 1 if
her δ ≥ pr2 because this would imply that her utility from resuming the service and
receiving a risky product in the second period is U2(r) = δ − pr2 ≥ 0. However, if
h < pr2 ≤ 1+h, the customer returns the product she does not like. Hence, she will like
the product, keep it and get a utility of (1− pr2) with probability δ, or dislike it and
incur the hassle cost of return (h) with probability 1− δ. It follows that her expected
utility from receiving a risky product in period 2 is U2(r) = δ (1− pr2) − (1− δ)h,
and the customer resumes the service in period 1 if U2(r) ≥ 0, or δ ≥ h1−pr2+h . (Note
that if pr2 > 1 the customer never resumes the service regardless of her δ, since the
price of the product is greater than the maximum value for the product, v = 1, and
resuming entails a negative expected utility.)
To continue the analysis of the second period subgame, we temporarily assume
that if the customer has joined the service in period 1, it entails that she has a
δ ≥ δ1, where 0 ≤ δ1 ≤ 1. The validity of this assumption is proven in the next
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section. Intuitively however, upon observing the firm’s prices (ps1, p
r
1) in period 1, if a
customer with δ1 who is indifferent between joining or not joining the service chooses
to join, then it stands to reason that a customer with a δ > δ1 would also join the
service. Moreover, as a result of observing the customer’s first-period actions, the
firm begins period 2 with the posterior pdf f (·) with support [δ1, 1]. The firm must
announce the prices and choose the product category to send to the customer.
Let πs2 and π
r
2 be the firm’s revenue from sending a safe product and a risky
product in period 2, respectively. Recall that the customer resumes the service at
the beginning of period 2 if her utility is non-negative. This occurs if the customer is
to receive a safe product (regardless of her δ), or if she is to receive a risky product
and her δ ≥ h
1−pr2+h
. For receiving a risky product in period 2, let us denote the






. With this in mind, if the
firm opts to send a safe product with a price ps2 ≤ 12 (to ensure a non-negative utility
for the customer), the customer will keep the safe product she receives and pays ps2.






and the optimal price is ps∗2 =
1
2
. Alternatively, if the firm opts to send a risky product
with h < pr2 ≤ 1, the customer resumes the service at the beginning of period 2 if her
δ ≥ δ2. Hence, the firm’s expected revenue is derived based on the joint probability














2) be the firm’s optimal price for risky products in period 2.
The firm sends a safe product if πs2 (p
s∗
2 ) ≥ πr2 (pr∗2 ). Lemma 2.2 establishes the firm’s
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optimal product and price choices in period 2, and the customer’s optimal response.
Moreover, for any given f (·), the equilibrium in the second-period subgame is unique.
Lemma 2.2. For any posterior pdf f (·), there exists a unique (ps∗2 , pr∗2 ) that maxi-
mizes the firm’s expected revenue from sending a risky or a safe product in the second
period. Given (ps∗2 , p
r∗
2 ), there exists a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium in the sec-
ond period played by the firm and the customer as follows:
(i) If πr2 (p
r∗








2 ); (b) the customer
resumes the service if her δ ≥ δ2 (pr∗2 ); (c) the firm sends a risky product; (d) the
customer keeps the product if her realized value is 1, and returns it otherwise.
(ii) If πr2 (p
r∗
2 ) ≤ πs2 (ps∗2 ), then (a) the firm announces (ps∗2 , pr∗2 ); (b) the customer
resumes the service; (c) the firm sends a safe product; (d) the customer keeps
the product.
All proofs are provided in Appendix A.
First-period subgame: We now bring the preceding analyses together and con-
sider the implications of customer behavior for the firm’s product choice and expected
revenue.
If the firm sends a safe product in period 1, the customer always keeps it, and
because of this, sending a safe product in period 1 never provides the firm with any
information regarding the customer’s taste δ; and in the absence of information about
δ, it is optimal for the firm to send a safe product. Therefore, if the firm chooses
to send a safe product in period 1, the firm sends another safe product in period





, and the firm’s optimal expected revenue is
π∗1(s) = 1. The customer joins regardless of her δ, and the firm extracts all customer
surplus.
If the firm chooses to send a risky product in period 1, the customer joins if her
δ ≥ δ1. She keeps the risky product if her realized value is v = 1 and returns it,
otherwise. Upon observing the customer’s response, following the Bayesian update
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function described in equations 2.1 and 2.2, the firm updates its belief as follows:
f (δ | keep) = 2δ
1− δ21
f (δ | return) = 2(1− δ)
1− 2δ1 + δ21
With these building blocks in hand, the firm’s revenue from sending a risky prod-
uct in period 1 with price pr1 can be derived from adding the revenues from periods












 π2(f (δ | return) )
The first expression denotes the probability that the customer keeps the product,
and the firm receives pr1, and subsequently, collects π2 in period 2 based on the firm’s
optimal response to observing a “keep” action. The second expression denotes the
probability that the customer returns the product and the firm receives 0, and collects
π2 in period 2 based on its optimal response to observing a “return” action.
Since πs1 = 1, the firm sends a risky product in period 1 if and only if π
r
1 > 1. This
implies that the firm will engage in experimentation with the customer in period 1 if
the expected revenue from doing so is higher. Recall that for a given set of prices and
realized value (for a risky product), the only determinant of the customer’s response
is the hassle cost of return, h. The following theorem establishes that an optimal
threshold, hdp, exists and is unique such that:
Theorem 2.1. Under dynamic pricing, ps∗1 =
1
2
















Furthermore, there exists a unique threshold hdp, such that if h < hdp, the firm sends
a risky product in period 1 (exploration equilibrium); and if h ≥ hdp, the firm sends
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a safe product in period 1 (exploitation equilibrium).
All proofs are provided in Appendix A
Theorem 2.1 implies that the firm’s optimal revenue only depends on the cus-
tomer’s hassle cost of return.
Under the exploration equilibrium, the firm must compensate the customer for
the risk she takes when receiving a risky product by pricing it below her maximum
reservation value. We observe that it is optimal for the firm to offer the risky product
in period 1 with a lower price such that it induces a customer with a lower δ to join
the service. The increase in the period 2 price following a keep compensates the firm
for the lower price in period 1 by extracting higher revenue, which we call the learning
effect. Proposition 2.1 establishes the firm’s and the customer’s equilibrium strategies
under the exploration subgame.
Proposition 2.1. Under the exploration equilibrium, (a) the firm announces (ps∗1 , p
r∗
1 );
(b) the customer joins the service if her δ ≥ h
1−pr∗1 +h
; (c) the firm sends a risky prod-
uct; and (d) the customer keeps the product if her realized value is 1 and returns it,
otherwise.
The second period’s subgame equilibrium is as follows:
(i) Following a keep observation, the firm’s posterior distribution of δ on the interval
[δ1, 1] is given by: f (δ) =
2δ
1−δ21
. The subgame equilibrium is as follows: (a) the
firm announces (ps∗2 , p
r∗





, and pr∗2 is the unique solution to the
implicit equation (1− pr2 + h)
4 = h3 (1 + 2pr2 + h); (b) the customer resumes
the service if her δ ≥ h
1−pr∗2 +h
; (c) the firm sends a risky product; and (d) the
customer keeps the product if her realized value is 1 and returns it, otherwise.
(ii) Following a return observation, the firm’s posterior distribution of δ on the
interval [δ1, 1] is given by: f (δ) =
2(1−δ)
1−2δ1+δ21
. The subgame is as follows: (a)
the firm announces (ps∗2 , p
r∗





, and pr∗2 = p
r∗
1 ; (b) the customer
resumes the service; (c) the firm sends a safe product; and (d) the customer
keeps the product.
All proofs are provided in Appendix A
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Under the exploitation equilibrium, the firm forgoes the benefits of learning and
personalization because it becomes increasingly costly to the firm to lower the price
of the risky product to convince the customer to join the service. Proposition 2.2
highlights the firm’s and customer’s equilibrium strategies under the exploitation
subgame.
Proposition 2.2. Under the exploitation equilibrium, the first period’s subgame equi-
librium is as follows: (a) the firm announces (ps∗1 , p
r∗
1 ); (b) the customer joins the
service; (c) the firm sends a safe product; and (d) the customer keeps the product.
In the second period, following a keep observation, the firm’s posterior belief is
that δ is uniformly distributed on the interval [0, 1]. The second period’s subgame
equilibrium is as follows: (a) the firm announces (ps∗2 , p
r∗






the solution to h2(1 + pr2 + h) = (1− pr2 + h)3; (b) the customer resumes the service;
(c) the firm sends a safe product; and (d) the customer keeps the product.
All proofs are provided in Appendix A
3.3 Fixed Pricing Equilibrium





2). We denote the prices with (p
s, pr) for simplicity3. Fixed pricing is particu-
larly relevant in settings where implementing price changes is costly or impractical
(Aviv and Pazgal, 2008). Under a fixed pricing mechanism, the firm announces the
prices for each product category, (pr, ps), at the start of period 1. The customer takes
this announcement as given (i.e. fixed) for both subscription periods, and decides
whether to join the service. If she joins, the firm must then choose from which cat-
egory to send a product. The customer observes her value for the product and opts
to keep or return it. Having observed the customer’s first period decisions, the firm
3Here we consider the case where the firm announces prices such that 12 < p
r ≤ 1 and ps ≤ 12 , so
that either categories are viable options to be sent to the customer and the customer joins/resumes
the service. Intuitively, if pr ≤ 12 it would never be optimal for the firm to send a risky product
since the expected revenue would be less than offering the safe category priced at 12 . Meanwhile if
the firm prices the safe (risky) category at ps > 12 (p
r > 1) the customer does not participate in
the game and the firm is left with 0 payoff. The validity of this statement is proven in the proof of
Lemma 2.3.
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then updates its belief about the customer’s taste, and decides from which category
to send a product in the second period. As with the dynamic pricing mechanism, we
analyze the two-period stochastic game between the firm and the customer in reverse
chronological order, while seeking pure-strategy subgame perfect Bayesian equilibria.
Second-period subgame: Assume in period 1 the customer with a δ ≥ δ1 has
joined the service. In period 2’s subgame, the customer’s decision to keep (return)
a product, and to resume (leave) the service, is identical to the dynamic pricing
case. Following the rational expectations framework, if the customer believes that
upon resuming the service the firm will send a risky product (which is correct in
equilibrium), she chooses to resume if her δ ≥ h
1−pr+h . On the other hand, if she
believes that upon resuming the service the firm will send a safe product, she chooses
to resume if ps ≤ 1
2
. Since the prices are fixed, the firm’s decision in period 2 is
limited to the product choice. The firm sends a risky product if the expected revenue
from sending a risky product is greater than the expected revenue from sending a safe







sf (s) ds (2.3b)
where f (·) is the posterior pdf of the firm’s updated belief about δ, after observing






Note that unlike the case of dynamic pricing, since period 2’s prices are not vari-
ables on which the firm can optimize in the second period, it implies that in solving
for the optimal revenue in period 2, δ2 is treated as a fixed parameter. Therefore,
to simplify our notation, we may denote the expected probability of the customer
keeping the product in the second period given f(·) as δu =
∫ 1
δ2
sf (s) ds. This brings
25
us to the following lemma.
Lemma 2.3. Given any δ1, posterior pdf f (·), ps and pr, there exists a unique sub-
game perfect equilibrium in the second period played by the firm and the customer as
follows:
(i) If δupr > ps, then (a) the customer resumes the service if her δ ≥ h
1−pr+h ; (b) the
firm sends a risky product to the customer; (c) the customer keeps the product
if her realized value is v = 1, and returns it, otherwise.
(ii) If δupr ≤ ps, then (a) the customer resumes the service; (b) the firm sends a
safe product; (c) the customer keeps the product.
All proofs are provided in Appendix B.
Considering period 2’s equilibrium as described in Lemma 2.3, if the firm’s optimal
strategy is to send a risky product, the customer with δ > δ2 is left with a surplus of
δ(1− pr)− (1− δ)h. Meanwhile, if it is optimal for the firm to send a safe product,
the customer is left with a surplus 1
2
− ps.
First-period subgame: The analysis of this section considers the strategic join-
ing behavior of the customer, and is centered around two main questions. The first
pertains to the optimal prices: how should the firm optimally make its pricing de-
cisions? The second question concerns the firm’s equilibrium product choice: given
the optimal prices of the safe and risky products, is it beneficial for the firm to ex-
periment with the customer? Theorem 2.2 describes the unique threshold-type pure
strategy equilibrium of the game, such that for h values below a threshold the firm
finds learning to be beneficial.
Theorem 2.2. Under fixed pricing, there exists a unique threshold hfp, such that if
h < hfp, the firm sends a risky product in period 1 (exploration equilibrium). Mean-
while, if h ≥ hfp, the firm sends a safe product in period 1 (exploitation equilibrium).
All proofs are provided in Appendix B
Under the exploration equilibrium, the firm sets the price of the safe product to
ps∗ = 1
2
− h. With this ps∗, the customer joins the service regardless of her δ (i.e.
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δ1 = 0), and receives a risky product in period 1. If she likes the risky product, she
keeps it. That said, she may choose to either resume or leave the service, depending
on whether her expected utility from receiving another risky product in period 2 is
non-negative. In other words, since δ1 = 0, a customer with an unfavorable taste for
risky products (i.e. δ  1) still chooses to join, and with a small probability, may like
the risky product and keep it. Given that the firm’s optimal choice upon observing a
“keep” action is to send a risky product in the second period, the customer expecting
a negative utility in the second period (i.e. U2(δ) = δ(1− pr)− (1− δ)h < 0), leaves.
However, if the customer dislikes the risky product, she returns it and receives a
safe product in period 2 at a price below her reservation value (v = 1
2
). Note that
with this pricing policy, the firm discounts the price of the safe product category for
the benefit of making a more informed product choice decision in period 2, without
compromising the price of the risky product category. The h < hfp threshold from
Theorem 2.2 implies that this is only beneficial if the firm can maintain its guaranteed
revenue from the safe category. In other words, if the firm needs to lower the price
of safe products due to the high hassle cost of return, then it becomes overly costly
for the firm to send a risky product (regardless of its expectation on the customer)
because the customer may return the product, and the firm will have to send a low-
priced safe product in response. The result also implies that the firm benefits from
the presence of the strategic customer. Namely, the customer with an unfavorable δ
still joins the service expecting that she will be compensated for her participation in
the experimentation phase in period 1, by enjoying a positive surplus in period 2.
Proposition 2.3. Exploration equilibrium: If h < hfp, there exists a unique period
1 subgame equilibrium such that (a) the firm announces (ps∗, pr∗), where ps∗ = 1
2
− h
and pr∗ is the implicit solution to 5 (1− pr + h)4 = 2h3 (1 + 2pr + h); (b) the customer
joins the service regardless of her δ; (c) the firm sends a risky product in period 1;
and (d) the customer keeps it if her realized value is v = 1, and returns it, otherwise.
Furthermore,
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(i) Following a keep observation, the firm’s posterior distribution of δ has a f (δ) =
2δ. (a) The customer resumes the service if her δ ≥ h
1−pr∗+h , (b) the firm sends
a risky product, and (c) the customer keeps the product if her realized value is
v = 1, and returns it, otherwise.
(ii) Following a return observation, the firm’s posterior distribution of δ has a
f (δ) = 2(1 − δ). (a) The customer resumes the service, (b) the firm sends
a safe product, and (c) the customer keeps the product.
Similar to the dynamic pricing mechanism, in a market with h ≥ hfp, the cost of
learning outweighs its benefit and hence, the firm opts to send a safe product to the
customer and avoids experimentation.
Proposition 2.4. Exploitation equilibrium: If h ≥ hfp, there exists a unique period
1 subgame equilibrium such that: (a) the firm sets (ps∗, pr∗), where ps∗ = 1
2
and pr∗
is the implicit solution to (1− pr + h)3 = h2 (1 + pr + h); (b) the customer joins the
service; (c) the firm sends a safe product in period 1; (d) the customer keeps the
product.
Furthermore, in the second period, the customer resumes the service and the firm
sends a safe product in period 2, which the customer keeps.
4 Discussion
We discuss several important implications of the results we obtained from the pre-
vious section. First, we compare the dynamic and fixed pricing equilibria in terms
of the firm’s pricing strategies and its expected revenue. We further investigate the
implications of each pricing mechanism on the firm’s customer acquisition and reten-
tion capability. Second, we focus on the implications of different return strategies for
the firm. Finally, we discuss the implication of our results for consumer surplus and
social welfare.
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4.1 Dynamic vs. Fixed Pricing
We first examine whether dynamic pricing is preferred by the firm, in the presence of
personalization. Intuitively, dynamic pricing should be preferred by the firm since the
flexibility offered by dynamic pricing enables the firm to take advantage of the learning
that takes place in period 1. In other words, whereas with a fixed pricing strategy the
firm’s only lever in period 2’s subgame is the product choice, it is expected that the
firm would benefit from a dynamic pricing strategy since it offers an additional degree
of freedom, temporal pricing. Interestingly however, we observe that the opposite is
true. Proposition 2.5 describes this observation, which is illustrated in Fig. 2·1.
Proposition 2.5. In the presence of experimentation, the firm’s expected revenue is
higher under fixed pricing than it is under dynamic pricing.
All proofs are provided in Appendix C.
Fixed pricing: exploration equilibrium
Dynamic pricing: exploration equilibrium












Figure 2·1: Optimal revenue as a function of h under dynamic and
fixed pricing.
According to Fig. 2·1, fixed pricing yields a higher revenue than dynamic pricing.
Furthermore, the firm can experiment with greater values of hassle cost (hfp > hdp).
The underlying mechanism that favors fixed pricing over dynamic pricing arises from
the customer’s forward-looking strategic behavior. Note that the strategic customer
joins the service if her expected utility is non-negative. Under fixed pricing, the firm
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discounts the price of the safe product so that a customer with an unfavorable taste
for the risky product participates in period 1’s experiment, knowing that she will
receive a safe product with a discounted price in period 2. Under dynamic pricing,
for 0 < h < hdp, the threshold above which the customer joins, δ1, is strictly greater
than 0 and therefore, the firm loses the customer at the initial point of interaction if
her δ < δ1. This occurs with a probability of δ1. However, under fixed pricing, the
customer joins regardless of her δ since δ1 = 0, which ensures full acquisition at the
point of contact.
Furthermore, as illustrated in Fig. 2·2, the firm’s single optimal price for products
from the risky category under fixed pricing, is greater than those of each period under
dynamic pricing (i.e. pdp1 , p
dp
2 < p
fp). The rationale behind this counterintuitive
observation is related to the discounted price of the safe category, which is depicted
in Fig. 2·3. Under fixed pricing, by pricing the safe category below the customer’s
reservation price, the firm is able to increase the price of products from the risky
category without compromising customer acquisition. Namely, the firm does not face
the risk that a subscription might not occur at all, in which case, the game would
end with the firm earning zero revenue.
To better highlight the differences between the firm’s exploration equilibrium un-
der fixed and dynamic pricing, we turn to the customer’s behavior with respect to
joining (and staying) in the subscription service. Fig. 2·5 presents the firm’s acqui-
sition threshold, δ1, and retention threshold, δ2, under fixed and dynamic pricing as
a function of hassle cost. As illustrated in the figure, the higher price of products
from the risky category under fixed pricing results in a higher δfp2 , and subsequently,
a lower retention in period 2. However, since δfp1 = 0, the firm not only enjoys full
acquisition in period 1, but also the additional expected revenue generated by a low-δ
customer who may like the risky product in period 1 with probability δ, and choose
30
to keep it, but leave the subscription in period 2.
4.2 Optimal Return Policy
The next question we investigate is whether the firm should allow returns. Let us
consider the period 2 subgame when the firm enforces a no-return policy. When
returns are not allowed, the customer’s expected utility from receiving a risky product
is U r(δ) = δ × 1− pr2; therefore she resumes the service if pr2 ≤ δ. The firm’s revenue
from sending a risky product equals the probability that the customer joins the service
(i.e. 1 − F (pr2) = 1 − pr2) and pays the price pr2: π(pr2) = (1− pr2) pr2, which for any
pr2, is less than the revenue generated from sending a safe product,
1
2
. This case is
repeated in period 1’s subgame. Consequently, when the firm enforces a no-return
policy, it is never optimal to send a risky product to the customer.
Therefore, a firm in a market with low hassle costs (i.e. where experimentation
is optimal) is better off if it allows returns with full refunds, which allows it to learn
customer tastes through experimentation. Meanwhile, in a market with high hassle
cost of returns (i.e. where exploitation is optimal), a firm is indifferent between not
allowing/allowing returns as it only offers safe products, for which the customer has
a known (and fixed) value, and always keeps.
Proposition 2.6. For any values of the hassle cost, the firm’s expected revenue is
weakly greater under a full-refund return policy compared to a no-return policy.
All proofs are provided in Appendix C.
Under the exploration equilibrium, we find that there are two main mechanisms
through which the firm benefits from allowing returns. The first mechanism echos a
recurring theme in the recent literature that considers the benefits of refund policies
as an uncertainty resolution mechanism (Cachon and Feldman, 2018). In the presence
of strategic customers, a full-refund return policy allows the firm to attract customers
at higher prices. The second mechanism is by learning the customer’s taste, which
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is unique to the subscription business model of personalization, and occurs through
repeated interactions with the customer.
An important byproduct of Theorems 2.1 and 2.2 is that under both fixed and
dynamic pricing, the firm’s revenue is maximized when the exogenous hassle cost of
return is zero (i.e. h = 0). In this case, the customer does not incur any return cost
when faced with a product they don’t like. An important question that remains is
whether or not the firm should share the burden of returns if h > 0. In practice, there
are several major curated subscription box businesses, most notably Nordstrom’s
TruckClub, that provide hassle-free returns through a 24/7 customer service and free
at-home pickups.
We modify the model presented in section 3 such that given a non-zero exogenous
h, the firm can choose to incur a portion of the cost. We assume h is split between the
customer and the provider: the customer incurs (1−α)h, and the provider incurs αh.
Therefore, if the customer decides to keep a product of value v at price p, her utility is
u = v− p. If she decides to return the product, her utility is −(1−α)h. We find that
under both fixed and dynamic pricing policies, the firm is strictly better off if it takes
all the hassle cost to itself (i.e. α = 1). Not only can the firm generate more revenue
by providing hassle-free returns, but also, it can experiment with greater values of h.
In other words, hα > hfp > hdp, where hα is the hassle cost threshold below which
experimentation is optimal. This is elaborated in Lemma 2.4.
Lemma 2.4. With an exogenous h < hα, the firm’s unique optimal return policy is











under both fixed and dynamic
pricing policies. The firm’s unique optimal product choice is such that:
(i) In period 1, the firm sends a risky product.
(ii) In period 2, the firm sends a risky product if it observes “keep” in period 1 and
sends a safe product, otherwise.
All proofs are in Appendix C.
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Fig. 2·6 illustrates the numerical comparison of the firm’s revenue when α∗ = 1,
and when α = 0 (i.e. the base model). There are several mechanisms through which
the profit function is affected by the introduction of α. First, taking away the hassle
cost of returns allows the firm to charge a higher price for the risky product. Sec-
ond, with α = 1 the customer faces no disutility from joining/resuming the service,
allowing the firm to attract and keep more customers. Noteworthy is that the dis-
advantage of α = 1 is not only that the firm incurs h, but it is also detrimental to
the firm’s learning. This is because the customer joins/resumes the service regardless
of her δ when (1− α)h = 0. Therefore, there is no truncation of the state space
(i.e. customers) from which the firm can learn. Nonetheless, the overall outcome of
internalizing all of the hassle cost is beneficial to the firm.
4.3 Implications for Social Welfare
Social welfare (SW) is the sum of customer surplus (CS) and the firm’s revenue
SW = CS + π. Therefore, to study the implications of our results for social welfare,
we must consider the customer’ perspective. We do so for three pricing strategies:
(i) dynamic pricing with α = 0, (ii) fixed pricing with α = 0, and (iii) optimal cost
sharing (where α∗ = 1 and there is no difference between dynamic and fixed pricing
strategies).
In all three pricing strategies, note that CS = 0 and SW = 1 in the exploitation
equilibrium since v = p = 1
2
. Therefore, differences in the exploration equilibrium
will determine the differences in CS and SW. Under dynamic pricing with α = 0,
for h < hdp, the customer expects a positive surplus from receiving a risky prod-
uct if her δ > δ1. If δ1 ≤ δ < δ2, given the equilibrium path described in lemma







Namely, the customer receives a risky product in period 1; if she likes the product
with probability δ, she keeps it and leaves the service; and if she dislikes the prod-
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uct with probability 1 − δ, she returns it and resumes the service to receive a safe
product in period 2. Meanwhile, if δ2 ≤ δ ≤ 1, the customer’s expected utility is






. The customer re-
ceives a risky product in period 1. She keeps the product and resumes the service
to receive a risky product in period 2 with probability δ; and returns the product
and resumes the service to receive a safe product in period 2 with probability 1− δ.




(s (1− pr∗1 )− (1− s)h) ds+
1∫
δ2
(s (1− pr∗1 )− (1− s)h+ s (s (1− pr∗2 )− (1− s)h)) ds
Under fixed pricing with α = 0, for h < hfp, the customer expects a positive surplus
regardless of her δ, such that if her 0 ≤ δ < δ2, given the equilibrium path described






and if her δ2 ≤ δ ≤ 1, U1(δ) =






. Replacing the parameters




s (1− pr∗) ds+
1∫
δ2
(s (1− pr∗) + s (s (1− pr∗)− (1− s)h)) ds (2.4)









h. Note that when α = 1, the firm prices the safe category at 1
2
, and
the risky category at 1, which extracts all surplus.
Fig. 2·7 and Fig. 2·8 provide equilibrium values of the total consumer surplus
and social welfare. As illustrated in this figure, under the exploration equilibrium,
if the customer is the party who incurs the hassle cost of return, in aggregate, the
customer is left with some surplus, which is increasing in h. The reason is that the
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firm’s optimal prices under both dynamic and fixed pricing are strictly decreasing in
h. However, if the firm is the party that incurs the hassle cost of return, the firm
extracts all surplus through perfect price discrimination. Therefore, surprisingly,
customers are better off if their hassle cost of return is non-zero. Additionally, it can
be observed that social welfare is higher under the exploration subgame equilibrium
of both dynamic and fixed pricing, which further underscores the expected value
generated by personalization.
5 Conclusion
We study how a subscription service firm should utilize its operational levers to learn
a strategic customer’s taste and personalize its services to her preferences. We find
that depending on the hassle cost of receiving an unwanted product, it can be optimal
for a firm to experiment with its content. Furthermore, we show that when facing
forward-looking customers, a fixed pricing strategy not only yields higher expected
revenue and allows the firm to experiment with higher hassle costs of return, but
also, maximizes customer acquisition. Fixed pricing also benefits the customer since
it leaves her with non-zero surplus.
Clearly, personalization can only be effective if the cost of experimentation (send-
ing unwanted products to the customer) is not excessive. Furthermore, fixed pricing
is the optimal pricing strategy only if the customers are forward-looking. Namely, the
customer with an unfavorable taste for risky products is willing to participate in the
experimentation with the knowledge that if they are patient, they will receive their
preferred product at a discounted price once the firm learns their preferences.
Interestingly, we find that a hassle-free return is desirable for the firm even if it
requires the firm to internalize the hassle cost to make this possible for the customer.
This is because the firm can offer products at the customer’s reservation price, while
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experimenting with risky, yet of higher value, products. The hassle-free returns strat-
egy highlights the benefits of learning in a setting with repeated interactions with the
customer, even if it obligates the firm to not only fully refund the customer but also,
































Figure 2·3: Safe category






















Figure 2·5: Acquisition and retention under exploration equilibrium
of dynamic and fixed pricing.
Fixed pricing: exploration equilibrium
















Figure 2·6: Optimal revenue as a function of h under dynamic and
fixed pricing with α = 0, and α∗ = 1
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Fixed pricing: exploration equilibrium
Dynamic pricing: exploration equilibrium















Figure 2·7: Consumer surplus
.5
Fixed pricing: exploration equilibrium
















Figure 2·8: Social welfare
Figure 2·9: Expected consumer surplus and social welfare as a func-
tion of h under dynamic and fixed pricing with α = 0 and optimal
α
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Appendix
Appendix A: Dynamic Pricing- General Case
Proof of Lemma 2.2.
Proof. Suppose the firm believes for an arbitrary δ1 that the customer joins the service
if her δ ≥ δ1. If the firm sends a safe product in period 1, as long as ps1 is such that
1
2
− ps1 ≥ −h, the customer keeps the product. Thus, when ps1 ≤ 12 + h the firm’s
posterior belief of δ remains unchanged (i.e. f(δ) ∼ U [δ1, 1]).
In the second period, expecting a safe product, the customer resumes the service if
ps2 ≤ 12 , and keeps the product. Given f(δ), the firm’s expected revenue from sending
a safe product equals πs2 = p
s
2. The expected revenue is increasing in p
s
2. Therefore,













Let us consider the subgame where given the updated belief f(δ), the firm opts
to send a risky product. If pr2 ≤ h, the customer resumes the service if her δ ≥ pr2
and keeps the product regardless of her realized value. Therefore, the firm’s expected
revenue equals πr2 =
∫ 1
δ2
pr2, where δ2 = max (δ1, p
r
2). Given our assumption that
0 ≤ h ≤ 1
2
, when pr2 ≤ h, πr2 ≤ 12 for any δ2. Consequently, it is never optimal for the
firm to send a risky product priced at pr2 ≤ h.
If pr2 > h, the customer keeps a risky product if her realized value is 1 and
returns it otherwise. Moreover, the customer resumes the service if her δ is such that
δ(1− pr2)− (1− δ)h ≥ 0 → δ ≥ h1−pr2+h . Therefore, the firm’s expected revenue from
sending a risky product equals πr2 =
∫ 1
δ2



































Therefore, the expected revenue is concave in pr2. If δ1 is such that 2(1 + h)δ
3
1 −
δ21h− h > 0, the revenue function is decreasing in pr2 and the optimal pr∗2 is the lower
bound on pr2 which is 1 − 1−δ1δ1 h. Otherwise, the revenue function has a unique local
maxima at pr∗2 , where p
r∗
2 satisfies h
2(1 + pr2 + h) = (1 − pr2 + h)3. Meanwhile, if
h
1−pr2+h





pr2 (1− δ21), which is strictly increasing in pr2.




2 ≤ 1− 1−δ1δ1 h: p
r∗
2 = 1− 1−δ1δ1 h. As
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such for a δ1, there exists a unique p
r∗
2 (δ1). The firm sends a risky product priced at
pr∗2 (δ1), in period 2, if and only if the expected revenue from sending a risky product
is greater than that of sending a safe product.
We now focus on the second period subgame which follows the firm sending a
risky product in the first period. Note, if h < pr1 ≤ 1 + h, the customer keeps a risky
product if her realized value is 1 and returns it if her realized value is 0. If in the first
period the customer keeps a risky product, the firm’s updated belief has the following
posterior pdf on the interval [δ1, 1]:






Given f (δ), the firm’s expected revenue from sending a risky product in the second






































< pr2 ≤ 1 (2.7)











(1− pr2 + h)4
− 12h
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(1− pr2 + h)4
)
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3(1 + 2pr2 + h)
(1− pr2 + h)4
)











A4 + 2Ah3 − 3h3 (1 + h)
)
Note, given SOC, we know FOC is decreasing in pr2 (increasing in A). Therefore, if
at the maximum value that A can get, the expression is negative, then the expected
revenue is decreasing in pr2. However, if at the maximum value that A can get, the
expression is positive and at the minimum the expression is negative, there exists an






< pr2 ≤ 1,
the maximum value that A can get equals A = h
δ1
. Replacing A’s maximum value








which is negative if 3(1 + h)δ41 > h(1 + 2δ
3
1) and positive otherwise. While the
minimum value that A can get is when pr2 = 1. Consequently A
min = h and the first








If δ1 is such that 3(1 + h)δ
4
1 > h(1 + 2δ
3
1), the function is decreasing in p
r
2 and the
optimal pr∗2 is the corner solution 1 − 1−δ1δ1 h. Otherwise, p
r∗
2 is the interior solution,
which is the first root of h3(1 + 2pr2 + h) = (1 − pr2 + h)4. Therefore, for any δ1,
there exists a unique optimal pr∗2 . Given the expected revenue from sending a risky






Finally, we consider the second period’s subgame where the firm sends a risky
product in the first period and the customer returns it. Given δ1, upon observing
that the customer returned a risky product in the first period, the firm’s posterior
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pdf of δ, distributed on the interval [δ1, 1], is:
f (δ | return) = p (v = 0 | δ) f(δ) dδ∫ 1
δ1
(1− δ) f(δ) dδ
=
1− δ
1− δ1 − 12 (1− δ
2
1)
























































1− δ1 − 12 (1− δ
2
1)




A4 + 3h2A2 − 2h2(3 + 5h)A+ 6h3(1 + h)
6A4
(




Note 1− δ1− 12 (1− δ
2
1) > 0, therefore, to determine the sign of FOC, we focus on the
sign of the numerator. Furthermore, we have h < A < h
δ1
. If 6(1 +h)δ31 < h(1 + δ1) +
4hδ21, then the first-order has a root at A
4 + 3h2A2 − 2h2(3 + 5h)A+ 6h3(1 + h) = 0.
However, if 6(1 + h)δ31 ≥ h(1 + δ1) + 4hδ21, the revenue function is strictly increasing
in A (decreasing in pr2 ).
To check for the optimally of A′ at A′4 + 3h2A′2− 2h2(3 + 5h)A′+ 6h3(1 +h) = 0,
when 6(1 + h)δ31 < h(1 + δ1) + 4hδ
2




































A2 − A(3 + 5h) + 4h(1 + h)
A5
When 6(1 + h)δ31 < h(1 + δ1) + 4hδ
2
1, at A
′, the SOC has a negative sign and the
function is maximized at A′.
Therefore, for any value of δ1, there exists a unique p
r∗
2 such that the firm sends a





. The customer resumes the service if her δ > h
1−pr∗2 +h
,
keeps the risky product if her realized value is 1 and returns it otherwise.
Proof of Proposition 2.1.







(pr1 + π2 (δ | keep)) s ds+
1∫
δ1
π2 (f (δ | return)) (1− s) ds
Note, as described in the proof of 2.2, in any induced period 2 subgame, pr∗2 (δ1) is
such that δ∗2 (δ1) ≥ δ1. Therefore, a customer of type δ1, either resume the service
and gets an expected utility equal to 0, or leaves the service. When h < pr1 ≤ 1, the
customer of type δ1 expects U1(δ1) = δ1(1− pr1)− (1− δ1)h from joining the service,




To analyze the subgame induced in period 1, we must first consider the subgame





• Upon observing “keep” in period 1, from Lemma 2.2 we have: when 3(1 +




2 is the first root of h
3(1 + 2pr2 + h) = (1− pr2 + h)4. The
firm sends a risky product in the second period if the corresponding revenue
is greater than 1
2
. Plugging in the value of δ1 and the induced p
r∗
2 , we have:
3(1+h)δ41 < h(1+2δ
3
1)→ 3h3(1−2pr1)+6h2(1−pr1)2+4h(1−pr1)3+(1−pr1)4 > 0
and the expected revenue function of the period 2 subgame (given in equations
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. When 3h3(1 − 2pr1) + 6h2(1 −
pr1)




have pr∗2 = p
r



















1− pr1 + 2h
+
h
1− pr1 + h
)
(2.11)












• Upon observing “return” in period 1, from Lemma 2.2 we have: if 6(1 + h)δ31 <




2 is the first root of 3h
2(3pr2 − 1)− 4h(1− pr2)2 − (1−
pr2)
3 = 0. Replacing δ1 with
h
1−pr1+h
, we have 6(1 + h)δ31 < h(1 + δ1) + 4hδ
2
1 →
3h2(3pr1−1)−4h(1−pr1)2− (1−pr1)3 < 0. The firm sends a risky product in the
second period if the corresponding revenue is greater than 1
2
. Plugging in the
value of δ1 and the induced p
r∗
2 , in the expected revenue function of the period









 pr∗2 < 12
Our numerical analysis shows for any pr1 that satisfies 3h
2(3pr1 − 1) − 4h(1 −
pr1)
2 − (1− pr1)3 < 0, the expected revenue from sending a risky product is less
than 1
2
. Therefore, when pr1 is such that 3h
2(3pr1−1)−4h(1−pr1)2−(1−pr1)3 < 0,




Meanwhile, when 3h2(3pr1 − 1) − 4h(1 − pr1)2 − (1 − pr1)3 > 0, upon a return
observation pr∗2 = p
r
1. Plugging in δ1 and p
r∗
2 , the expected revenue from sending
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 pr1 = pr1(1− pr1 + 3h)3(1− pr1 + h) (2.12)







Suppose pr1 is such that:
• The firm sends a risky product upon a keep observation priced at pr∗2 where pr∗2
is the first root of h3(1 + 2pr2 + h) = (1− pr2 + h)4. Therefore, δ1 < δ2 (pr∗2 ) and
3(1 + h)δ41 < h(1 + 2δ
3
1). Moreover, the expected revenue from sending a risky
product in the second period, given by equation 2.10, must be greater than the
expected revenue from sending a safe product (i.e. 1
2
).
• The firm sends a safe product priced at 1
2
upon a return observation. Therefore,
the expected revenue from sending a risky product in the second period, given
by equation 2.12, is weakly smaller than the expected revenue from sending a
safe product (i.e. 1
2
).






(pr1 + π2 (δ | keep)) s ds +
1∫
δ1
π2 (f (δ | return)) (1− s) ds








Given the equilibrium path described above we have, π2 (δ | return) = 12 and













(pr1 + π2 (δ | keep)) s ds +
1∫
δ1


































1− pr1 + h
+
h2





The first expression in the revenue function denotes the expected revenue from







2 , the customer
joins and keeps the product and the firm earns pr1. The second expression denotes
the expected revenue from period 2 given that the customer keeps the product in
period 1. Finally, the last expression denotes the expected revenue from sending a
safe product priced at 1
2
in period 2, if the customer returns the product in period 1,
with the joint probability
∫ 1
δ1







2 . Note pr∗2 is the root







< 0. Therefore, the revenue function is








2(1− pr1 + h)2
− h
2pr1






(1− pr1 + h)3
− h
(1− pr1 + h)2
)
=
−pr13 + 3(1 + h)pr12 − (3 + 5h+ 4h2)pr1 + 1 + 2h+ 2h2
2(1− pr1 + h)3
Therefore, the expected revenue has a local maxima which satisfies −pr13 + 3(1 +
h)pr1
2 − (3 + 5h + 4h2)pr1 + 1 + 2h + 2h2 = 0. Note given pr∗1 , and pr∗2 , all the belief
consistency constraints are met for any values of h.
In short, in the first period, the firm’s optimal pricing strategy is to announce pr∗1 .
The customer joins the service of her δ ≥ h
1−pr∗1 +h
. The firm sends a risky product.
Upon realizing her value, the customer keeps the product if her realized value is 1 and
returns it otherwise. The period 2 subgame depends on the action of the customer
in period one such that:
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• Upon a keep observation, the firm announces pr∗2 where pr∗2 is the first root
of h3(1 + 2pr2 + h) = (1 − pr2 + h)4. The customer resumes the service if her
δ ≥ h
1−pr∗2 +h
. The firm sends a risky product, which the customer keeps if her
realized value is 1 and returns otherwise.
• Upon a a return observation, the firm announces pr∗1 =
1
2
. The customer resumes
the service. The firm sends a safe product, which the customer keeps.






















1− pr∗1 + h
+
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Note if in the first period the firm announces pr1 ≤ h, the customer joins if her
δ ≥ pr1. The firm sends a risky product, but does not update its belief about the
customer’s taste. Moreover, since h ≤ 1
2
, the expected revenue is strictly smaller
than the one described above, ruling out the pricing strategy (pr1 ≤ h) as optimal.
Finally, if the firm sets pr1 such that the optimal period 2 subgame following a keep
observation, is for the firm to send a safe product, then it is intuitive that the firm
does not benefit from learning and the strategy is inferior to the optimal strategy
described above.
Proof of Proposition 2.2.
Proof. At end of period 1, if the firm sent a safe product and the customer kept it,
the firm does not gain any new information about δ and believes it to be uniformly
distributed on interval [0, 1]. According to the proof of Lemma 2.2, in period 2, the
firm sends a safe product priced at 1
2
, which the customer keeps. Therefore, the firm
earns 1
2
in the period 2 subgame. In period 1, given ps1, the customer joins if p
s




. The customer joins and the firm sends a safe product in both
periods. The firm earns πs1 = 1 in revenue.
Proof of Theorem 2.1:





. Finally, the firm sends a
risky product in the first period if and only if its expected revenue from sending a
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risky product (equation 2.13 is greater than that of sending a safe product in both




Note that at h = 0, the firm’s expected revenue from the risky product equals 13
12
.
Using the envelope theorem, it immediately follows that the firm expected revenue,
evaluated at pr∗1 and p
r∗



















Note, the revenue function is concave and continuous at pr∗1 and p
r∗












1 )(1− (1− 2h)pr∗1 )
2(1− pr∗1 + h)3
− h
2(1− pr∗2 )pr∗2
(1− pr∗2 + h)4
< 0 (2.14)
Therefore, there exists the threshold hdp such that the firm sends a risky product
in period 1 (exploration equilibrium) if h < hdp and a safe product (exploitation
equilibrium), otherwise.
Appendix B: Fixed Pricing
Proof of Lemma 2.3.
Proof. Suppose a customer joins the service if her δ ≥ δ1. If the firm sends a safe
product in period 1, the customer keeps it, regardless of her δ. Thus, the firm’s
posterior belief of δ remains unchanged (i.e. f(δ) ∼ U [δ1, 1]). In the second period,
expecting a safe product, the customer of type δ resumes the service if ps ≤ 1
2
, and
keeps the product if she receives it. Given f(δ), the firm’s expected revenue from
sending a safe product equals πs2 = p
s.
Let us consider the subgame where given the updated belief f(δ), the firm sends a
risky product. The customer keeps a risky product if her realized value is 1 and returns
it otherwise. Moreover, the customer resumes the service if δ(1− pr)− (1− δ)h ≥ 0.
Therefore, the firm’s expected revenue from sending a risky product equals πr2 =∫ 1
δ2





. The firm sends a risky product in period
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2, if and only if the expected revenue from sending a risky product is greater than
that of sending a safe product (i.e. πr2(δ1, p
r) > ps).
If the firm sends a risky product in the first period and the customer keeps it, the
posterior pdf is f (·) = 2δ
1−δ21
. Given f (δ), the firm’s expected revenue from sending


















. Therefore, the firm sends a risky product if and only
if the expected revenue from sending a risky product is greater than that of a safe
product.
Meanwhile, if the firm sends a risky product in period 1 and the customer returns
it, the firm’s posterior belief has the following distribution: f (δ) = 1−δ
1−δ1− 12(1−δ21)
.
Given f (δ), the firm’s expected revenue from sending another risky product in the













(1− δ2)2(1 + 2δ2)
3(1− δ1)2
(2.16)





. Again, the firm sends a risky product if and only if the
expected revenue is greater than ps.
Proof of Proposition 2.3:
Proof. Suppose the firm sends a risky product priced at pr. To derive δ1 (i.e. the
δ above which the customer joins the service in period 1), we derive the customer’s
expected utility given the equilibrium path:
Suppose pr is such that in period 2, the firm sends a risky product upon observing
keep in period 1, and a safe product upon observing return. Based on Lemma 2.3,






. Meanwhile, upon returning the safe product in period 1, she
resumes the service if ps ≤ 12 . Therefore, we have,
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• If δ ∈ [0, δ2] then the customer’s expected utility from joining the service and




− ps − h
)
.
• If δ ∈ [δ2, 1] then the customer’s expected utility is δ (1− pr) − (1− δ)h +






≥ 0. Therefore, a customer of type
δ where δ ≥ δ2 expects a non-negative utility from joining the service.
If ps > 1
2






−pr+ps+h and if p
s ≤ 1
2
− h, δ1 = 0. Regardless, we have
h
1−pr+h > δ1, therefore, δ2 =
h
1−pr+h . The firm’s expected revenue from sending a




(pr + π2 (δ | keep)) s ds +
1∫
δ1
π2 (f (δ | return)) (1− s) ds




















































Suppose, the firm sets ps ≥ 1
2






−pr+ps+h . When, h is less than h
′,
where h′ is the second root of −5 + 20h′ − 30h′2 + 22h′3 + 5h′4 = 0, the expected
revenue is strictly decreasing in ps. Thus, ps∗ = 1
2
− h, δ1 = 0 and the revenue
function is concave in pr and is maximized at pr∗, where pr∗ is the first root of
5(1− pr + h)4 = 2h3(1 + 2pr + h). However, when h > h′, the revenue function has a
unique pr∗ and ps∗, where: pr∗ and ps∗ jointly solve equations 2.17 and 2.18.











(1−2pr∗+2ps∗+h)3 = 0 (2.18)




and pr∗ is the first root of 5(1− pr + h)4 = 2h3(1 + 2pr + h)), the numerical analysis
shows for any h ≤ h′, ps∗ and pr∗ satisfy both constraints. However, when h > h′, the
second constraint is only satisfied when h < 0.464205. Therefore, for h >≈ 0.464205,
our numerical analysis indicates that ps∗ binds the second constraint.
In short, for h ≤ h′, where h′ ≈ 0.43336 (which is of interest to us), ps∗ = 1
2
− h
and pr∗ is the first root of 5(1− pr + h)4 = 2h3(1 + 2pr + h). The firm sends a risky
product priced at pr∗ in the first period. The customer joins the service regardless of
her δ. The firm sends a risky product. The customer keeps the product if her realized
value is 1 and returns it otherwise. The firm sends a risky product upon observing
















Proof of Proposition 2.4:
Proof. When the firm sends a safe product in the first period, its belief about the
customer’s taste remains unchanged and therefore, as described in Lemma 2.3, the
firm sends another safe product in the second period. The optimal price in such a
case is ps∗ = 1
2
where the firm sends a safe product in both periods and extracts all
surplus. Therefore the optimal revenue is 1. This subgame equilibrium is the unique
period 1’s safe product subgame equilibrium.
Proof of Theorem 2.2:
Proof. Given the results of Proposition 2.3 and Proposition 2.4, the firm sends a risky
product in the first period if and only if its expected revenue from sending a risky
product (equation 2.19) is greater than that of sending a safe product in both periods









< 0. Using the envelope theorem, it immediately follows that the firm expected
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(1− pr∗ + h)4
+
4(2ps∗ − (1− 2h)pr∗)
(1− 2pr∗ + 2ps∗ + 2h)3
)
< 0 (2.20)
Therefore, there exists the threshold hfp such that the firm sends a risky product
in period 1 (exploration equilibrium) if h < hfp and a safe product (exploitation
equilibrium) otherwise.
Appendix C
Proof of Proposition 2.5:
Proof. Note at h = 0, the optimal expected revenue under dynamic and fixed pricing
equals 13
12







Therefore, πfp1 > π
dp
1 , and h
fp > hdp.
Proof of Proposition 2.6:
Proof. Under a no return policy, suppose a customer joins the service if her δ ≥ δ1.
Given that in the first period, the customer has no other option than to keep the
product, the firm’s posterior belief of δ remains unchanged (i.e. f(δ) ∼ U [δ1, 1]).
In the second period’s subgame, if the firm announces pr2 and is expected to send
a risky product, the customer resumes the service if her δ ≥ pr2. Therefore, the
firm’s expected revenue equals πr2 =
∫ 1
δ2




2 ≤ 12 for any
δ2. Consequently, it is never optimal for the firm to send a risky product in the
second period. Similar results are achieved in the first period’s subgame. Therefore,
under a no return policy, the firm’s optimal action is to send a safe product in both
periods.
56
Proof of Lemma 2.4:
Proof. Under dynamic pricing with α, in the second period subgame, the customer
resumes the service if δ ≥ δ2, where δ2 = (1−α)h1−pr2+(1−α)h . Given the posterior belief
distribution f (·), the firm’s optimal price for the risky product maximizes: 1∫
δ2
sf(s)ds
 (pr2 + αh)− αh (2.22)
With α, under dynamic pricing, the proofs for the existence and the uniqueness of pr∗2 ,
in spirit, are similar to the proofs provided for Lemma 2.2. To solve for the first period
subgame, we analyze the possible induced subgames given the customer’s behavior
in period 1. Let us consider the first period subgame where the firm sends a risky
product. The customer keeps a risky product if her realized value is 1 and returns it
otherwise. If the firm sent a risky product in the first period and the customer kept
it, the firm sends a risky product priced at pr∗2 which is the first root of polynomial
(1− pr2 + (1− α)h)
4 = (1−α)3h3 (1− 4pr2 + (1− 4α)h). The firm’s expected revenue






(pr1 + π2 (δ | keep)) s ds +
1∫
δ1
(−αh+ π2 (f (δ | return))) (1− s) ds
Where π2
(
f (δ | keep)
)
= (pr∗2 + αh)
∫ 1
δ2(pr∗2 )









. Plugging in the values, we have that in the first period






































(1− δ21)− 13 (1− δ
3
1)
1− δ1 − 12 (1− δ
2
1)
(pr1 + αh)− αh ≤
1
2







. Note pr∗2 does not depend on p
r
1.
There exists a unique solution to the maximization problem at the second root of the
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polynomial of degree three: pr
3
1 − 3(1 + (1− α)h)pr
2
1 + (3 + 5(1− α)h+ 2(1− α)(2−
α)h2)pr1−2(1−α)2h3−2(1−α)h2−2(1−α)h−1 = 0 which satisfies the equilibrium
constraints.
Using the envelope theorem, it follows that the firm expected revenue, evaluated
at pr∗1 and p
r∗




















Note, the revenue function is concave and continuous at pr∗1 and p
r∗







= 0. Therefore, α∗ = 0.
Similar results are attained solving for the fixed-pricing equilibrium.
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Chapter 3
Coordination of Streaming Platforms in
the Presence of First-Party Content
1 Introduction
A video streaming platform operates as a two-sided market. The platform aggregates
a bundle of content – either produced by the platform itself or sourced by third-party
providers – and offers users unlimited access to the bundle in exchange for a sub-
scription fee. Offering users with heterogeneous taste a large bundle of independent
content has two advantages: first, users are more likely to find content that matches
their taste; second, users who are uncertain about their valuation for each individual
content, can predict their valuation for the collection of bundle more easily (i.e. with
higher certainty). In short, this business model increases the platform’s ability to
extract consumer surplus by means of reducing the heterogeneity in users valuations
(see Abdallah et al. (2021) for a recent review of the literature on bundling). How-
ever, as opposed to a typical two-sided market, in which one (or both) side pays a
fee each time that a transaction occurs, in a subscription-based market, users pay
a fixed price to enter the market and consume content at their own discretion (see
Sanchez-Cartas and Leon (2019) for a comprehensive review of the literature on the
pricing theory in multi-sided markets). Similar to a typical two-sided market, in the
presence of strong indirect network effects, each individual provider benefits from the
existence of other providers, which, collectively, incentivizes more users to join the
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service by virtue of its higher value. However, since the consumers pay for access to
the complete bundle – and not an individual content – it is difficult to isolate the
standalone revenue generated by the presence of a single provider.
In practice, streaming platforms employ a variety of revenue allocation rules to
compensate providers. “Revenue-sharing” and “licensing” payment structures are the
two most common. Under a revenue-sharing contract, the platform allocates a share
of the total revenue generated from subscription fees to the third-party providers. This
share is further divided amongst individual providers, proportional to the realized
consumption of their content on the platform. The revenue sharing model is used
by streaming platforms such as Amazon Prime, Spotify and Hulu. Under a licensing
contract, the platform offers a lump-sum to secure the right to the content of a
provider for an agreed-upon period of time1. The licensing revenue allocation rule is
employed by streaming platforms such as Netflix and HBO MAX.
Not all content create the same externalities. That is a provider’s content may
contribute more to the utility function of the subscribers, but the provider may not
necessarily be compensated for it. The presence of popular TV-shows or classic movies
(hereafter denoted by “popular content”) generates greater externalities than their
“niche” counterparts. Consequently, providers of popular content demand higher
shares of revenue from the platform in return for the exclusive rights to their con-
tent2. Therefore, to maintain their revenue, platforms offer heterogeneous royalty
fees to providers3. Over the last few years, most streaming platforms have invested
1See Brian Beer, How Netflix Pays for Movie and TV Show Licensing on Investopedia.
2In 2019, Netflix lost the streaming rights to The Office as the producers of the show “Universal
Television” made a “take it or leave it” $100 million per-year offer (for five years).
3Hulu’s royalty rate for big content providers yield a 20%-30% of generated revenue
to Hulu, but with smaller content providers the revenue split goes as high as 50%-50%
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/hulu-makes-a-profit-video-content-owners-not-so-much/. Amazon
Prime, on the other hand, pays content providers between 6 cents and 15 cents per hour of streaming.
Specifically, for content that are streamed less than 10,000 hours the royalty rate is 6 cents; and for
content that are streamed over 1 million hours, the rate is 15 cents: https://digiday.com/future-of-
tv/amazon-royalties-video-makers-uploading-prime-video/
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in creating their own content (hereafter denoted as first-party content) in response to
the high fees associated with securing the rights to stream popular content. There-
fore, their business models have transformed from being a third-party aggregator, to a
hybrid model operating as a third-party aggregator and first-party content producer.
This shift further complicates the coordination problem of the two-sided platform. As
an experience good, whose quality cannot be ascertained by users before purchase, the
production of media content exhibits significant uncertainty. Therefore, the platform
faces a trade-off between obtaining third-party content at a high cost, or investing in
the production of her own uncertain content.
The aim of the present paper is thus twofold. First, we explore the performance
of prevalent revenue allocation rules (revenue-sharing and licensing) in coordinating
the two-sided platform4. Second, we investigate when it is optimal for the platform
to invest in the risky production of first-party content, and the investment’s impact
on the platform’s optimal content-mix, prices, and welfare. To our knowledge, little
is known in the nascent literature about the optimal coordination strategies of video
streaming platforms, and their interplay with the platform’s strategic investment in
the risky production of first-party content. There are three fundamental building
blocks that distinguish our paper from the literature on coordination of two-sided
markets, described as follows:
• Sequential entry: theoretical research mostly assumes that the two sides enter
the market simultaneously, and derives the market equilibrium, accordingly
4Two-sided platforms must coordinate the interdependent joining decisions of the two sides of the
market. In a simultaneous game, a coordinating pricing strategy solves the following chicken & egg
problem: suppose the stand-alone utility of users on both sides from joining the platform is negative.
To induce buyers (sellers) to join, the platform must convince the sellers (buyers) join as well. The
market faces unfavorable expectation if given any pricing strategy no user joins from either side.
The literature on two-sided market studies this problem and suggests strategies to overcome the
unfavorable expectation (Caillaud and Jullien, 2003). In our problem, however, given the sequential
entry of the two-sides, a coordinating contract between the platform and the providers maximizes
the total revenue generated from the bundle in the resulting subgame perfect equilibrium.
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(Parker and Van Alstyne, 2005; Weyl, 2010)5. In our setting however, given
that a user must pay the subscription fee ex ante, and consume the content ex
post, simultaneous entry does not apply. Specifically, the platform must first
attract the providers to join; and only once the content-mix is determined can
the platform present the user with the bundle to attract her.
• Revenue structure: in the prior two-sided markets literature, sellers set their
own prices and derive revenue directly from each interaction with their buyer;
and the platform’s revenue is determined from the royalty fee collected from
each transaction. However, in a bundling and subscription setting, providers
relinquish their right to setting their own prices, and the platform governs the
price for its entire bundle. Providers are paid separately once the platform
collects all revenue generated from the user side.
• First-party content: research in the two-sided platforms literature that examines
the platform’s investment in first-party content is scarce. Close to our work
is Hagiu and Spulber (2013) which shows that the platform may overcome
an undesirable market Nash equilibrium where no buyers or sellers join by
attracting buyers through the strategic introduction of first-party content. Our
paper is a sequential entry market, so 1) a nobody joins equilibrium does not
exist; 2) we study the platform’s strategic investment in the production of first-
party content as a means to increase participation on both the user and provider
side.
To achieve our goals, we develop a two-period game-theoretic model of a monopoly
two-sided streaming platform that aggregates content from a single popular content
5Hagiu and Jullien (2011) assume a market where buyers enter the market after sellers (sequential
entry) and study the incentives of an information intermediary to divert the search of buyers. Hagiu
and Spulber (2013) study the platform’s pricing strategies under sequential entry when the platform
may offer some integrated content to appear more attractive to buyers.
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provider and a mass of niche providers. In the first period, the platform makes a
take-it-or-leave-it offer to the providers, which the providers can accept or reject,
given their outside option. The outside option for niche providers is negligible, which
allows the platform to procure their content at a low cost. On the other hand, the
popular content provider has a non-negligible outside option, and joins the platform
only if her expected revenue from joining the platform is not less than her outside
option. In the second period, the content available on the bundle is known under each
revenue-allocation rule, and the platform sets a subscription fee. Users are uncertain
about their valuation for each individual content apriori, and realize their value only
upon sampling the content. Therefore, users make their decision to join the platform
based on their expected valuation of the entire bundle and the subscription fee set
by the platform. Upon joining, users sequentially sample the content available to
find a single unit of content that matches their taste. If a user is matched with a
content, she stops sampling and consumes that content. On the other hand, if she
does not find a content that matches her taste after sampling all available content,
she leaves without consuming any. Under the revenue-sharing contract, the payoff
to each provider is derived from users’ consumption of their content. This model
allows us to gain insights regarding the platform’s optimal pricing and content-mix
strategies under each revenue allocation rule.
We show that the two-sided market is coordinated with a licensing contract. In
our problem a coordinating contract between the platform and the popular provider
maximizes the total revenue generated from the bundle in the resulting subgame
perfect equilibrium. Under licensing, the platform’s choice of subscription fee and
consequently, the total net revenue generated from the bundle in the second stage,
is decoupled from the platform’s choice of payment to providers in the first stage.
Our analysis further shows that under revenue-sharing, the platform strategically
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manipulates the popular content’s consumption rate by setting a higher subscription
fee such that users with an exceedingly unfavorable taste for niche content do not join.
Effectively, since the platform announces the subscription fee only after the providers
have joined, the platform’s optimal action is to maximize its revenue by reducing
the payment to the popular provider. We show that a price commitment strategy
– where the platform credibly commits to the price it will charge the subscribers
when trying to attract the providers to join the platform – under revenue-sharing is
able to address this problem, and coordinate the market. The advantage of revenue-
sharing with price commitment is not surprising. Without price commitment, the
popular provider correctly anticipates the platform’s pricing strategy in the second
stage, and subsequently demands a higher royalty fee which, in turn, decreases the
platform’s profit. Conversely, with price commitment the platform gives up her right
to manipulate the consumption rate of content via pricing, and thus convinces the
popular content provider to join with a smaller royalty fee; this maximizes the total
generated revenue from the bundle.
Next, we incorporate the platform’s strategic production of first-party content
in our model. We endogenize the probability of the first-party content successfully
becoming a popular content by characterizing it as an increasing function of the
platform’s investment. The quality of the first-party content – whether it is ultimately
popular – is realized only after the providers have made their joining decisions. First,
we find that the presence of the popular content provider generates higher revenue for
the platform. Specifically, the presence of a popular provider guarantees that some
of the users with unfavorable taste for niche content join the platform, regardless of
whether the first-party production is successful (i.e. popular) or unsuccessful (i.e.
niche). That said, we also find that when the platform (correctly) anticipates the
participation of the popular content provider, she invests significantly more in her
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first-party production. This is because a successful production accompanied by the
presence of the popular provider results in much higher demand and higher total
revenue. To reach this equilibrium, the platform is also willing to compensate a
higher outside option for the popular provider. However, if the popular provider’s
outside option cannot be compensated, the platform still invests in the production of
first-party content, albeit, significantly less.
2 Literature Review
Our work relates to the stream of the literature on two-sided market and the design
of media platforms. The literature on two-sided platforms highlights the cross-side
externalities that spur growth on both side of the market (Parker and Van Alstyne,
2005) and provides a theoretical framework for analyzing these markets (Rochet and
Tirole, 2006; Armstrong and Wright, 2007). Jiang et al. (2017) provide a compre-
hensive review of literature on two-sided market pricing in operations management
and pose the sequential entry as a main future research direction. Closely related to
our work is the body of literature that examines a media platform’s optimal pricing
strategies on both sides of the market. Li et al. (2020) studies the interaction be-
tween ad-supported media platforms and users and the implications of three different
pricing models for selling digital music: ownership, subscription and mixed pricing
models. Using a stylized model, they find that the optimal pricing strategy depends
on the platform’s advertising revenue rate and consumers disutility from consuming
advertisements. This study focuses on the interaction between users and the plat-
form, where the revenue generated from the subscription is derived from ads. The
paper also omits the interaction between the platform and the supply side. Lei and
Swinney (2018) studies the decision of creators of digital goods to distribute their
content a la carte or via subscription services, optimally. They model the selling de-
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cision of two content creators (low and high quality) via the platform. The creators
can choose to sell their content a la carte and/or via subscription. The platform com-
pensates the creators via revenue sharing contracts with homogeneous royalty fees.
They find that the platform cannot induce only the high quality creator to sell via
subscription which entails that the content offered via subscription is of lower quality
compared to a la cart. A few studies have investigated the design of optimal pricing
for ad-supported media platforms in the presence of user’s advertisements disutility
(DeValve and Pekeč, 2016; Armstrong and Weeds, 2007). In this paper, however,
we consider the interaction between users, the platform, and the content providers
and characterize the optimal design of the platform, when 1) each side enters the
market, sequentially, and 2) the platform collects revenue generated from the bundle
and distribute a portion of the revenue amongst providers. Our work is also related
to the stream of literature on the coordination of a two-sided platform when the plat-
form invests in producing first-party content. In particular, Anderson Jr et al. (2014)
investigate the platform’s choice to invest in new product development, in the video
game consoles industry with network externalities. They build a stylized model to
study the trade-off between investing in high platform performance versus lowering
the investment to facilitate the third-party content development. Hagiu and Spul-
ber (2013) introduce the investment in first-party content as a strategic variable for
two-sided platforms to make participation more attractive to buyers, independently
of the presence of the sellers. The paper considers homogeneous sellers, all of whom
join the platform if the profit is non-negative or none joins otherwise. Thus, the
platform’s pricing on the seller side is not taken as the decision variable in the profit
maximization problem.
Furthermore, in this study, we leverage intuition from the rich literature on the
bundling of information goods (Bakos and Brynjolfsson, 1999; Geng et al., 2005;
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Bhargava, 2021; Abdallah et al., 2021). Most of the work on bundling investigate the
benefits of pure bundling as well as the platform’s optimal pricing strategies. For in-
stance, in their seminal paper, Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1999) finds that bundling very
large numbers of information goods with i.i.d consumer valuations achieves greater
profit and economic efficiency (all consumer surplus is extracted). They argue that
this is in part because of the law of large numbers which allows users to predict their
expected utility from a large bundle of content much easier than their expected utility
from individual content. Geng et al. (2005) examines the optimality of bundling when
a user’s utility from consuming the goods declines with the number of information
goods consumed. They show as long as the consumer values do not decrease too
quickly, bundling is approximately optimal. In a study of the economic structure of
co-production markets, Bhargava (2021) draws insights from the bundling literature
to build an algebraic expression of bundle demand. Similar to Bhargava (2021), we
draw from the literature to design a user’s utility function such that the utility of a
user increases in the number of content available on the platform, but at diminishing
rate. However, in contrast to Bhargava (2021), we allow for heterogeneity of taste
amongst users and thus, heterogeneity in the externalities created by each content.
Note that in this setting as apposed to a classic two-sided market, the utility of users
is non-linearly increasing in the number of sellers (providers) on the other side of
the market. Furthermore, we make the assumption that the platform has access to
and may invite a large enough collection of content such that users find at least one
content that matches their heterogeneous taste, albeit the value they get from the
consumption of the content may vary. This assumption is particularly relevant in the
context of digital goods where platforms offer users access to thousands of content in
their libraries (Alaei et al., 2019).
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3 Model Description
We model a monopolist two-sided streaming platform that offers users with heteroge-
neous tastes an unlimited access to a bundle of digital goods, for a flat fee. The plat-
form may be an aggregator, which bundles content only from third-party providers,
or a hybrid, which produces first-party content, in addition to being an aggregator.
The market is populated by a continuum of users of total mass normalized to 1 and
a large pool of content providers. We assume a single subscription period, during
which users may sample as many products as they like, but ultimately consume at
most one content from the bundle.
The platform may compensate its providers using one of two revenue allocation
contracts: revenue-sharing or licensing. Under the revenue-sharing structure, in the
first stage the platform offers to distribute a share of its revenue amongst providers
proportional to the streaming rate of their content on the platform6. Under the
licensing structure, the provider allocates revenue according to a previously agreed-
upon lump-sum payment.
We model the interaction between the platform, providers and users in a sequential
game. We provide an overview of the model when the platform is an aggregator and
hybrid, in the remainder of this section.
As shown in Figure 3·1, the interaction between the aggregator platform, providers,
and users occurs over two stages. At the beginning of the first stage, the platform
chooses a subset of providers to invite to join the platform, and the payment struc-
ture by which providers are compensated. Next, the invited providers decide whether
to join (denoted as the provider’s joining decision). At the beginning of the second
stage, the bundle of providers on the platform are known, and the platform announces
6This revenue allocation strategy is prevalent amongst media streaming platforms. See Lei and
Swinney (2018) and Alaei et al. (2019) for a similar revenue sharing structure in the study of digital
goods subscription services.
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the subscription fee to users. The users observe the subscription fee and the bundle
of content, and decide whether to subscribe to the platform (denoted as the users’
joining decision). Finally, the revenue of the bundle is realized based on the fraction




decision (only in 
hybrid case)
Platform chooses 
subset of providers 













Stage 0: hybrid 
platform’s production
Stage 1: provider-side Stage 2: user-side
Type of first-party content is 
realized (only in hybrid case)
Figure 3·1: Timeline of events
We extend the baseline model to analyze the market equilibrium when a hybrid
platform produces a unit of “first-party” content to add to its bundle. The develop-
ment of first-party content is uncertain in that apriori the platform does not know the
quality of the resulting production. As shown in Figure 3·1, the interaction between
the hybrid platform, providers, and users occurs over three stages. In stage zero, the
platform makes a production decision. In stage one, the platform chooses the subset
of providers to invite to join the platform, and the payment structure. Subsequently,
the providers who are invited, choose whether to join the platform. Prior to the sec-
ond stage, the quality of the first-party production is realized. The game continues
in the second stage in a similar manner as the baseline model.
3.1 Providers
For simplicity, we assume that each content provider offers one unit of content
and therefore, the number of content available in the bundle equals the number of
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providers that join the platform7. We consider two types of third-party providers
based on the content they offer: niche and popular. A niche provider owns content
that caters to only a small set of users and therefore, has a high valuation dispersion
amongst users. In contrast, a popular provider owns content that is “popular”, and
caters to a broad range of users; therefore, this content has low valuation dispersion
amongst users. For simplicity we assume there are a single popular provider and a
sufficient pool of niche content providers, each of which may choose to participate in
the platform8. A content provider faces a trade–off when making her content available
on the platform. On one hand, she receives a payment from the platform to make her
content available. On the other hand, she incurs an opportunity cost from offering
her content through the platform and not selling it through other channels. We nor-
malize the outside option of the niche providers to zero, but set the opportunity cost
of the popular provider to θ.9 This allows us to focus on the coordination problem of
the platform when there is a large value creation disparity between a popular content
compared to a niche content. Moreover, given that there exists a large number of
niche providers, assuming a zero outside option for them is reasonable. The popular
provider joins the platform if and only if her expected revenue is weakly greater than
her outside option, θ. In section 6.1, we extend the model to allow for positive outside
option for niche providers, and observe that our main results hold.
7Hagiu and Spulber (2013) and Hagiu and Wright (2015) make the same assumption when mod-
eling a two-sided platform similar to our setting
8The assumption of large assortment of niche contents, is particularly valid in the context of
digital goods and was first used in the seminal paper by (Bakos and Brynjolfsson, 1999) on the
bundling of large number of information goods with zero marginal costs. As an example, there are
more than 13,000 movies on Amazon Video Prime and the subscription service offers an estimate
of 1,400 movies per dollar spent, while Netflix has over 15,000 titles in its catalog and offers 1,600
titles per dollar spent.
9Examples of such instances can be found in markets such as music or entertainment industry.
For instance, popular artists such as Taylor Swift and Pink Floyd (Guardian, 2018) or producers
of popular TV shows such as The Office and Friends (Times, 2018) have been able to negotiate




A user realizes her value for a content only upon sampling it. A user expects to
receive a value of 1 or 0 from the popular content, each with a probability of 1
2
.
Meanwhile, she receives value x from a niche content with a probability of p, and
0 with a probability of 1 − p. A user is said to be “matched” with a content if her
realized value is greater than 0. We assume p 1
2
and that x is distributed across the
population uniformly on the (0, 2] interval. As such, a user of type x with 1 < x ≤ 2
receives a higher value (x) from consuming a matched niche content than a matched
popular content. Therefore, she sequentially samples the niche contents available in
the bundle to find a content that matches her taste (e.g browsing through contents
in Netflix or reading movie descriptions); and if she does not find such content, she
moves on to sample the popular content. On the other hand, a user of type x with
0 < x ≤ 1, receives a higher value from the popular content if it matches her taste
and therefore, she samples the popular content first, and if she is not matched, she
moves on to sequentially sampling from the niche contents available in the bundle to
find one that matches her taste. A user’s type x is known to her but is unknown to
the platform.
3.3 The Motivation Behind The Users’ Utility Function
Given the description above, an important question to address is why wouldn’t all
consumers want to sample the popular content first? Our model setup is motivated
by the long tail phenomena. The “long tail” effect theorizes that an expanded product
variety, increases the consumption of niche products, while decreasing the demand
for popular products (Anderson, 2006; Brynjolfsson et al., 2011). The effect is most
pronounced in industries such as the media industry, that generally have highly het-
erogeneous and variety-seeking consumers who enjoy different types of contents. The
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large size of the bundle of niche contents allows users to search for contents that are
closest to their preferences and satisfy their heterogeneous tastes. This shifts away
some consumers from a “hit” or “popluar” content towards niche contents. However,
as empirically shown by Tan et al. (2017), not all consumers search for niche con-
tent, and some prefer to consume popular content. Hence, allowing some users to
enjoy a higher value from consuming a niche content than the popular content (i.e.
1 < x ≤ 2) captures these observations found in the literature.
Furthermore, we assume users do not incur any search cost and sample contents
until they find one that matches their taste. This assumption is reasonable in the
context of media streaming platforms and is supported empirically by the digital
goods literature. Specifically, access to accurate search engines, convenient browsing
and personalized recommendation systems have reduced users’ search cost and sub-
sequently, have increased the collective share of consumption of niche and obscure
products (Brynjolfsson et al., 2011).
Finally, we assume that user x’s valuations for the niche content are drawn inde-
pendently from identical Bernoulli distributions with support on {0, x} and a success
probability p. One can interpret x as the maximum value a user of type x can get from
consuming a niche content that matches her taste. Arguably, the IID assumption is
only reasonable if the niche content are not differentiated vertically (e.g., they have
the same attributes in terms of quality/genre) and also that the distribution of the
valuation (x) only depends on the user type and not the content. The assumption of
independent valuations is common in the bundling literature (see for example Bakos
and Brynjolfsson (1999); Geng et al. (2005); Abdallah et al. (2021)). This assumption
simplifies the analysis, but does not drive the results. Since we model the user’s deci-
sion for a single viewing, the user’s expected utility from subscribing to the service is
solely driven by the probability that she finds at least a content to consume. By the
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weak law of large numbers, as the number of available niche contents on the platform
(n) goes to infinity, this probability goes to 1, even when there are strong positive
or negative correlations amongst the user preferences for the niche contents (Geng
et al., 2005). In sections 7.1 and 7.2, we relax the IID assumption and show that our
results hold in the presence of dependent and non-identically distributed valuations,
respectively.
4 The Aggregator Platform
We begin our analysis by considering the case where the platform does not engage
in content creation and operates strictly as a content aggregator. We introduce the
first-party content creation decision later in Section 5. The game is analyzed using
backward induction. First, we consider the subgame played in the second stage be-
tween the provider and the users given an arbitrary bundle of contents (which depends
on the presence of the popular provider and the number of niche providers present
on the platform) and establish the platform’s subscription fee strategy and the users’
optimal joining decision. Then, we analyze the first period subgame played between
the platform and the providers and derive the platform’s optimal payment structure
under each contracts and the providers joining decisions. Proofs are available in the
appendix.
4.1 Licensing Contract
The model includes three players: the platform, the providers and the users. The
sequence of events and the players’ set of decisions are as follows. At the start of
the first stage, the platform selects the number of niche content providers to invite to
join (n) and the offer to make to the popular provider (R). Therefore, the platform’s
set of decisions in the first period is (n,R). The providers observe the offer made by
the platform and choose whether to join or not. The popular provider joins if the
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platform’s offer R is weakly greater than her outside option θ. While niche providers
join if they are invited given that their outside option is normalized to zero. At the
start of the second stage, the platform’s only decision is to announce the subscription
fee (s). The users observe the bundle of content and the subscription fee (s) and
choose whether to join or not. At the end of the game, demand is realized and the
platform collects the subscription fees.
In the second stage a user of type x observes the subscription fee (s) and the
presence of the popular and niche contents on the platform and chooses to join if
her utility U(x) from joining is non-negative. Consider the case where the bundle
offered by the platform does not include the popular content. Then, given that there
exists n niche content in the bundle, a user of type x finds at least one content that
matches her taste with probability 1−(1− p)n and receives a value x from consuming
it. Recall that x is uniformly distributed between [0, 2] and that a user realizes her
value for a content only upon sampling it, and therefore, her utility at the time
she makes her joining decision is unknown to her. She joins if her expected utility
from joining is non-negative. A user of type x’s expected utility from subscribing is
U(x) = (1 − (1 − p)n) (x) − s. Consequently, users with s
1−(1−p)n ≤ x ≤ 2 join the







On the other hand, if the popular content is included in the bundle, user x’s
expected utility from joining the platform when 1 < x ≤ 2 is as follows:




Observe that with probability (1 − p)n, user x will not find a niche content she
likes and therefore, samples the popular content. She will like the popular content
(receive value 1) with probability 1
2
.









(1− (1− p)n) (x)− s (3.2)
In effect, as described in section 3.2, when the popular content is present, for any
n, a user of type 1 < x ≤ 2 expects a higher utility from joining the service than does
a user with 0 < x ≤ 1, and there is a discontinuity in users’ utility function at x = 1.
For a user of type x = 1, we break the tie in favor of the popular content. Namely,
we assume a user of type x = 1 samples the popular content first, and if it does not
match her taste, she moves on to sampling the niche content.
A user joins if her expected utility from joining is non-negative. If s ≤ 1
2
the user’s
expected utility from joining is non-negative for any x and the demand equals D(s) =
1; in other words, for any x we have U(x) ≥ 0 where U(x) depends on x and is given
by equation 3.1 for 1 < x ≤ 2 and equation 3.2 for 0 ≤ x ≤ 1. If 1
2
< s ≤ 1− (1−p)n,





(1−(1−p)n) (refer to equation 3.2) expect a non-negative utility from
joining the platform. As such when 1
2
< s ≤ 1 − (1 − p)n, the platform’s demand is










. Meanwhile, when 1 − (1 − p)n < s ≤ 1, users




1−(1−p)n expect a non-negative utility from joining the platform (refer to










when s > 1
2
no users join and D(s) = 0.
In order to simplify the notation, hereafter, we define the variable y = (1− p)n as
the probability that a user is not matched with any niche contents, given that there
are n niche content available in the bundle. Note that p is a given parameter and
therefore for any value of y we derive n = log y
log(1−p) .
The total revenue generated in the second stage is Π(s) = D(s)s where D(s)
denotes the demand for the service given the subscription fee (s), which is essentially
the mass of users who choose to join the platform. The platform’s optimal subscription
fee decision (s∗) is the argument that maximizes Π(s) which depends on the presence
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of popular and niche providers on the platform, and is provided in Lemma 3.1.
Lemma 3.1. In the pricing subgame, the optimal subscription fee depends on the the
presence of providers in the following way:
1. If the popular provider and n niche providers are present, if y ≤ 1
2
, the platform
sets s∗ = 1
4
(3− 2y), otherwise, the platform sets s∗ = 1
2
.
2. If the popular provider is absent and n niche providers are present, the platform
charges s∗ = 1− y.
Proof. An arriving user observes the bundle of content available on the platform. If





(1 − y) (x) − s from joining the platform and a user with an 1 < x ≤ 2
expects a utility U(x) = (1−y) (x)+y (1
2
)−s. For any value of y < 1, the expected
utility of a user of type x where 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 is less than that of user of type x where
1 < x ≤ 2 . If s ≤ 1
2
, then users join regardless of their taste parameter x, D(s) = 1
and Π(s) = D(s)s = s. The profit is strictly increasing in s and therefore, s∗ = 1
2
and Π(s∗) = 1
2
. If s > 1
2
, D(s) = 1 − 2s−1






function is concave in s. Therefore, if y ≤ 1
2
, s∗ = 1
4
(3− 2y) and Π(s∗) = (3−2y)
2
16(1−y) ,
otherwise, s∗ = 1
2
and Π(s∗) = 1
2
. If the popular content is not present, then a
user x expects a utility equal to U(x) = (1 − y) (x) − s. Consequently, we have
D(s) = 1 − s





s. Since Π(s) is concave in s, s∗ = 1 − y
and Π(s∗) = 1
2
(1− y).
In the first stage, the platform must choose the lump-sum payment (R) to offer
to the popular provider and the subset of the niche providers to invite to join the
platform (y). The platform has the option not to invite the popular provider (R = 0).
If so, the platform’s optimal strategy is to invite a large number of niche providers
to join; guaranteeing that a user x finds a niche content that matches her taste (i.e.
y∗ → 0). In this case, in the second stage, according to lemma 3.1, the the optimal
subscription fee is s∗ = 1 and subsequently, D(s∗) = 1
2
. The platform’s expected
revenue from the bundle equals 1
2
. Meanwhile, if the platform chooses to invite
the popular provider, she must ensure R meets the popular provider’s participation
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constraint. The platform’s expected revenue is derived from the subgame perfect
equilibrium that is followed in the second stage (as described in lemma 3.1. Note
from 3.1 that in the presence of the popular provider and when y ≤ 1
2
, the subgame
that is followed is such that the platform sets s∗ = 1
4
(3− 2y) and the realized demand
is D(s∗) = 1− 2s∗−1









We find, the expected profit is strictly decreasing in y. Therefore, the platform
sets y∗ = 0 and offers R∗ = θ to the popular provider. Replacing the parameters with
their values, the expected revenue equals π = 9
16
− θ, which brings us to the following
theorem:
Theorem 3.1. With the licensing contract, in equilibrium, the aggregator platform
pays R = θ to the popular provider, if and only if the popular provider’s outside option
(θ) is smaller than the expected surplus generated by her presence on the platform (i.e.
θ ≤ 1
16
). The platform invites a large pool of niche providers, regardless.






















Therefore, y∗ = 0, and R∗ binds the popular provider’s participation constraint.
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As such, the platform invites the popular provider to join if and only if the revenue
generated from the presence of the popular content (i.e. 9
16
− θ) is greater than the
revenue generated from the bundle of a large number of niche contents (i.e. 1
2
).
In other words, the platform invites the popular provider if and only if the plat-
form’s profit from the presence of the popular provider is greater than the platform’s




⇒ θ ≤ 1
16
). The licensing
contract serves as a benchmark, providing the maximum expected revenue that the
coordinated system can achieve.
4.2 Revenue Sharing Contract
In this section we begin with a brief discussion of the case where the platform does not
differentiate between providers and compensate all with the same royalty fee. We then
move on to the case where the platform offers different royalty fees to heterogeneous
providers. We find none of the two revenue-sharing achieve coordination and explain
how price commitment strategy on users side can help the platform to coordinate the
two-sided market.
Homogeneous Royalty Fee
In this model, the platform collects subscription fees from all users who choose to
join the service. The platform retains a fraction 1− r of the total generated revenue
and splits the remainder amongst providers proportional to the consumption of their
content. Therefore, the platform’s set of decisions in the first period is given by (y, r).
All other aspects of the game remains similar to the licensing contract described in
the previous section.
Consider the final stage’s subgame. Because at this stage r is already determined,
the platform’s revenue function is written as πm = D(s)s(1− r). Note, the platform
pays the same royalty fee per consumption regardless of the content that is consumed.
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The platform chooses s∗ similar to the strategy described in Lemma 3.1.
In the first stage, the platform has the option to set r = 0, in which case, the
popular provider’s participation constraint is not met and only niche providers. The
platform’s revenue equals 1
2
. If the platform chooses to invite the popular provider,
her optimal choices of y∗ and r∗ maximizes her expected profit given that the popular





s.t. rD(s∗)s∗κ ≥ θ
where, from Lemma 3.1 we have s∗ = 1
4
(3− 2y) and subsequently D(s∗) = 1− 2s∗−1
2(1−y) .





1−y ≤ x ≤ 1, subscribes and samples the popular content first, and if it
matches her taste (with a probability of 1
2
), consumes it. A user of type x, where
1 < x ≤ 2, however, samples the niche contents first and if she does not find one that
matches her taste (with a probability of y), she moves on to sampling the popular
content. The probability that a user x who is present on the platform consumes a
content is 1− 1
2
y. Where 1− 1
2
y denotes the probability that a user finds at least one
content that matches her taste amongst all content available in the bundle. Therefore,






















1 + 2y − 2y2
6− 7y + 2y2
The rate of consumption of popular content is strictly increasing in y. The platform
faces a trade-off between inviting a large pool of niche content and hence increasing
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the net generated revenue, and reducing her share of the revenue by setting a higher
r to compensate the popular provider. On the other hand, higher y entails smaller
r, but also smaller total generated revenue. We find for θ ≤ 3
304
, the platform invites
all niche providers, and sets r such that it binds the popular provider’s participation
constraint. However, for higher values of θ, y∗ ≥ 0 and y∗ is increasing in θ.












1 + 2y − 2y2
6− 7y + 2y2
≥ θ
Given that the platform’s profit function is strictly decreasing in r, r∗ is the argument










1+2y−2y2 θ. The optimal
choice of y depends on the value of θ. Note we are interested in the θ parameter
region where there exists 0 ≤ y ≤ 1
2
such that the expected revenue from inviting
the popular provider is greater than that of inviting a large pool of niche providers
and earning 1
2
. Therefore, we include the platform’s participation constraint in the






− 6− 7y + 2y
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1 + 2y − 2y2
θ
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19− 28y + 10y2
(1 + 2y − 2y2)2
θ






− 6− 7y + 2y
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− 4 (26− 57y + 42y
2 − 10y3)
(1 + 2y − 2y2)3
θ
For θ ≤ 1
832
, the expected revenue is concave upwards in y (recall 0 ≤ y < 1
2
) and has
a local minimum. Therefore, the expected revenue is maximized at one of the corner
solutions. Plugging in y = 0 and y = 1
2
, we find for θ ≤ 1
832
, the expected revenue
is maximized at y∗ = 0. Meanwhile, for 1
832
< θ ≤ 1
16
, the revenue function has a
point of inflection at y′′, below which the expected revenue is concave downwards
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and above which is concave upward. When 1
832
≤ θ ≤ 3
304
, and y ≤ y′′ the revenue
function is strictly decreasing in y. While for y > y′′, the expected revenue is strictly
increasing in y. Therefore, plugging in y = 0 and y = 1
2
, we find for 1
832
≤ θ ≤ 3
304
,
the expected revenue is maximized at y∗ = 0. Finally, for 3
304
≤ θ ≤ θhr, y∗ is the
solution to the first-order condition, which is y∗ < y′′, and therefore, is the local
maxima of the expected revenue function for 0 < y < 1
2
. y∗ is the first root of
(3 − 2y)(1 − 2y) (−2y2 + 2y + 1)2 = 16θ(1 − y)2 (19− 28y + 10y2), and θhr, is the
value of θ above which it is not worthwhile for the platform to invite the popular
provider(θhr ≈ 0.01).
This result echos that of Lei and Swinney (2018), in that, a revenue-sharing con-
tract with a single revenue-sharing parameter and a linear revenue-split rule cannot
optimally allocate the revenue amongst providers. The results also highlights the
fundamental inequity between popular providers’ compensation and the surplus they
bring to the platform, which has been a topic of legal debate in recent years. The
debate is most prominent in the music streaming industry, with platforms such as
Spotify and Pandora employing similar revenue-sharing structures.
Heterogeneous Royalty Fees
We now return to the model with individual revenue-sharing model, where the plat-
form compensates the popular provider with a share of the revenue r which is specific
to the popular provider. We begin by deriving the second stage’s subgame perfect
equilibrium. At this point in the game, the revenue sharing parameters (r) has been
determined. Under revenue sharing, given that the popular provider is present, the
platform pays rκ fraction of the total generated revenue to the popular provider. The
probability that a user who is present on the platform finds a content that matches
her taste equals 1− 1
2
y. While, the probability that a user x with 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 consumes
the popular content equals to 1
2
and a user x with 1 < x ≤ 2, consumes the popu-
lar content if and only if she searches for a content that matches her taste amongst
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niche contents and does not find any (with a probability of y). Thus, the expected




































Let πm be the profit of the platform. The platform’s optimal subscription fee is the




















< s ≤ 1− 1
2
y
Lemma 3.2 describes the platform’s optimal subscription fee strategy, given the pres-
ence of the popular provider and r and y parameters. Lemma 3.2 entails that when
the popular content is present on the platform, for a non-zero revenue-sharing param-
eter r > 0, the platform’s optimal subscription fee under revenue-sharing is strictly
greater than that of licensing. In effect, given that the platform must share the
generated revenue with the popular provider proportional to the consumption of the
popular content, she attempts to extract some of this revenue by pricing the subscrip-
tion higher such that the users with unfavorable taste for the niche content do not
participate.
Lemma 3.2. There exists a unique s∗ that maximizes πm and is governed by the
presence of the popular provider and niche providers on the platform:
1. When the popular provider is present, the optimal subscription fee depends on











2. If the popular is not present, s∗ = 1− y.
Proof. Under revenue sharing, the user’s decision to join is analogous to that of

































































< 0. The profit function is concave in s. There-




, s∗ = (2+r)y
2−7y+2(3−r)







In the first period, the platform simultaneously chooses the mass of niche providers
to invite to join (i.e. y) and the revenue-sharing parameter (i.e. r) to compensate
the popular provider with. The platform chooses r∗ and y∗ that maximizes her profit









We find r∗ and y∗ are such that for a small enough θ (θ ≤ 5
144
), y∗ = 0 and the
platform invites all niche providers. Moreover, for θ ≤ 5
144
, r∗ is the argument that
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binds the popular provider’s participation constraint. However, for larger values of θ,
to meet the popular provider’s participation constraint, the platform is forced to invite
less niche providers and consequently, increase the expected rate of consumption of
the popular content. Therefore, for larger values of θ, the number of niche contents
available is decreasing in θ.




(6− 7y + 2y2 − r (2− y2))2
16(2− y)(1− y)(2− r − y)




r (6− 7y + 2y2 − r (2− y2)) (2 + 3y − 6y2 + 2y3 − r (2− y2))
16(2− y)(1− y)(2− r − y)2
≥ θ
Before we solve for the optimal r and y, let us analyze the revenue function of the
popular provider(πpp), which is strictly increasing in y, and concave in r. For y < y
′,
where y′ is a fixed point and is the first root of −8 + 28y − 27y2 + 8y3 = 0, the
revenue function has a maximum at r′, which is the implicit solution to the first-
order condition. Therefore, for a θ ≤ πpp(r′), the revenue function meets θ at two
points. Because the platform’s expected revenue is strictly decreasing in r, we infer




While for y > y′, the revenue function is strictly increasing in r and the function is
maximized at r = 1. Furthermore, we look for the optimal solution for values of θ
where the expected revenue is greater than 1
2
; which holds if
r ≤
4− 2y − 6y2 + 7y3 − 2y4 −
√
8 (8y − 20y2 + 10y3 + 13y4 − 17y5 + 7y6 − y7)
(2− y2)2




16(2−y)(1−y)(2−r∗−y)2 − θ = 0 With the envelop
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(6− 7y + 2y2 − r (2− y2))2
16(2− y)(1− y)(2− r − y)2
− (2− y
2) (6− 7y + 2y2 − r (2− y2))
8(2− y)(1− y)(2− r − y)




< 0 and therefore, y∗ = 0, and subsequently, r∗ is the first
root of r3 − 4(2θ + 1)r2 + (32θ + 3)r − 32θ = 0. While, for 5
144
< θ <≈ 0.0449, the
platform’s revenue is maximized at the first order condition dπm
dy
= 0.
Finally, the maximum surplus generated by the presence of the popular provider
on the platform is strictly smaller than 1
16
, which indicates that compare to licensing,
under revenue-sharing the platform cannot afford higher values of θ. With sequential
entry, even for small values of θ where y∗ = 0, platform’s optimal pricing strategy
s∗ = 3−r
∗
4−2r∗ in the second stage is increasing in r
∗. In effect, given r∗, the platform sets
a high s∗ to dissuade users with unfavorable taste for niche contents from joining the
platform, decreasing the rate of consumption of popular content and increasing her
own share of the revenue. The popular provider correctly anticipates the platform’s
strategy in the second stage and demands a higher r, which in turn decreases the net
generated revenue.
Heterogeneous Royalty Fees with Price Commitment
Now suppose the platform is able to commit to a subscription price when making an
offer to the popular provider. Therefore, the platform makes her pricing decision in
the first stage, simultaneously with her y and r decisions. If the platform chooses to
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The platform’s optimal choices are y∗ = 0, r∗ = 32θ
3
and s∗ = 3
4
. The platform’s




the platform invites the popular provider if and only if θ ≤ 1
16
.
Theorem 3.2. With the revenue-sharing contract, the platform achieves coordination
with heterogeneous royalty fees and price commitment.
Proof. r∗ binds the popular provider’s participation constraint. Therefore, r∗ =
2θ(2−y)(1−y)
s(2−2s−y2) . Given r




























< 0⇒ y∗ = 0
4.3 Mechanism Comparison
Our primary finding is that if price commitment is not feasible, the platform prefers
the licensing contract to the revenue-sharing contract. The reason is that the li-
censing contract decouples the content-mix and subscription fee decisions from the
compensation of the popular provider, coordinating the two-sided market. With
revenue-sharing the platform’s subscription fee decision and consequently, the total
net revenue generated from the bundle, inevitably, is influenced by the revenue-sharing
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parameter r. As r increases the platform must increase the price of the bundle to
compensate for the high royalty fee. Furthermore, we find that under revenue-sharing,
when the outside option of the popular provider is greater than a threshold, it is no
longer optimal for the platform to invite all niche providers and y∗ > 0. Finally, we
find that for small enough θs the revenue-sharing contract performs near optimal, but
as θ increases, the gap between the performance of the licensing and revenue-sharing
contract increases.
Next we investigate consumer surplus under each mechanism. When the market is
coordinated (via licensing or revenue-sharing with price commitment), the platform
sets the subscription fee s∗ = 3
4
and invites all niche providers to join. Therefore, the




























Under revenue-sharing, however, the expected consumer surplus depends on θ. Given
the royalty fee r∗(θ) and the mass of niche content on the platform y∗(θ), the plat-
form’s optimal strategy in the second period subgame according to Lemma 3.2 is to
set the subscription fee equal to s∗(θ) = (2+r
∗(θ))y∗2(θ)−7y∗(θ)+2(3−r∗(θ))
4(2−r∗(θ)−y∗(θ)) . Given s
∗, the





































Therefore, the consumer surplus is maximized in a coordinated market. The next
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proposition determines that licensing and revenue-sharing with price commitment are
both socially optimal; achieving the highest total surplus generated.
Proposition 3.1. Licensing and revenue-sharing with price commitment are the so-
cially optimum contract.
5 The Hybrid Platform
Consider the setting where the platform has the opportunity to invest in producing
its own content. We assume that the probability of success – defined by the content
becoming popular – is an increasing function of the amount of investment devoted
to its production. Specifically, consistent with the literature, we assume a quadratic
cost function to capture this. When the platform selects a success probability of φ, it
incurs a cost of cφ2, where c denotes the platform’s production cost factor (Feldman
et al., 2019).
In stage zero, the platform makes an investment decision φ. In the first stage, the
platform invites the providers. The providers observe φ, anticipate the joining decision
of other providers and the platform’s pricing strategy in the final stage and choose to
accept (or reject) the platform’s offer. In the second and final stage, the platform’s
production uncertainty is resolved and the platform chooses the subscription fee to
charge; observing the subscription fee and the content available in the bundle, the
users choose to join (or not). To simplify the model we assume that if the production
fails to become a popular content the platform does not include the output in the
bundle.
The timeline is justified based on evidence from practice, where the content pro-
duced by the platform is released gradually. We also assume that the uncertainty
is resolved when the platform makes its subscription fee decision. For example, a
video streaming platform such as Netflix adjust its subscription fee annually upon
realizing the value of the bundle to the users. Meanwhile, since in practice users can
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join (leave) the subscription at any point in time, we assume the users’ decision to
join also takes place after the platform content’s type is realized.
The game is solved through backward induction starting with the subscription fee
subgame.
5.1 Licensing Contract
In the final stage, one of the following subgames is realized:
1. The popular provider is present and the platform’s production succeeds. In
this case the platform’s optimal subscription fee is s∗ = 3
4
and all users join
D(s∗) = 1.
2. The popular provider is present and the platform’s production fails. In this
case the platform’s optimal subscription fee decision follows that described in
Lemma 3.1.
3. The popular provider is absent, and the platform’s production succeeds. In this
case, the subgame equilibrium described in Lemma 3.1 applies.
4. The popular provider is absent and the platform’s production fails, in which
case s∗ = 1− y and D(s∗) = 1
2
In the first stage, given φ the platform must choose the content-mix. If the platform










s.t. R ≥ θ
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The platform optimal strategies are R∗ = θ and y∗ = 0. Meanwhile, if the platform









The expected profit is strictly decreasing in y and thus y∗ = 0. Therefore, in the first
stage the platform makes an offer to the popular provider if and only if θ ≤ 1
16
(1+2φ).
Noteworthy is that in the presence of investment in first-party content (φ > 0), the
expected surplus generated by the presence of popular content increases, and the
platform invites the popular provider with higher values of θ, compared to when
φ = 0 and the platform does not make an investment. In the first stage, given the
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16
− cφ2 − θ
s.t. θ ≤ 1
16
(1 + 2φ)




, φ∗ = 3
32c
and the platform invites the popular provider
to join. Otherwise, φ∗ = 1
32c
and the platform does not make an offer to the popular
provider, which brings us to the following theorem:




, in equilibrium, the plat-
form makes an investment of I(φ∗), where φ∗ = 3
32c
, in the production of her first-
party content, invites all niche providers and makes an offer of R = θ to the popular
provider.
Proof. Consider the case where the platform invites n niche providers and chooses to
invest in its own content production. The content becomes popular with probability
φ and the platform earns an expected revenue of (3−2y)
2
16(1−y) . Whereas with probability
1− φ the production fails and the bundle generates an expected revenue of 1
2
(1− y).
The platform’s expected profit is φ (3−2y)
2
16(1−y) + (1− φ)
1
2
(1− y) and is strictly decreasing




















. Now consider the case where given a
production decision of φ, the platform invites the popular provider. If the platform





y) (x)− s from joining the platform and a user with an 1 < x ≤ 2 expects a utility
U(x) = (1 − y) (x) + y (3
4
) − s. Consequently, the platform’s optimal subscription
fee is s∗ = 3
4
, all users join, D(s∗) = 1 and Π(s∗) = 3
4
. Meanwhile, if the production
is unsuccessful, then the platform’s optimal profit is given by (3−2y)
2
16(1−y) . Therefore, the
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the platform invites the popular





in the production of the popular content.
5.2 Revenue-Sharing Contract With Price Commitment
If price commitment is feasible, in the second stage, given φ, the platform must
commit to a pricing strategy which includes the subscription fee if the production
succeeds (sp) and the subscription fee if the production fails (sf ), when inviting the
providers. Therefore, in the second stage the platform chooses y, r and sp and sf ,
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(
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If θ ≤ 1
16
(1 + 2φ), the platform’s optimal strategy is to invite all providers to join.
Thus, y∗ = 0, r∗ = 64θ
6+3φ





. Otherwise, the platform invites all niche






. When the platform invites the
popular provider, she commits to the same subscription fee regardless of the outcome
of the production. However, if the production succeeds, all users join the service and




. In other words, the addition of first-party popular content to the bundle
generates revenue by increasing the user base of the platform.





, in equilibrium, the platform makes an investment of I(φ∗), where φ∗ = 3
32c
,
in the production of her first-party content, invites all niche providers and makes an
offer of r = 2048cθ
9+192c
to the popular provider.
Proof. Consider the case where the platform invites the popular provider and the
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s.t. φ
(
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sprκp + (1− φ)
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Let us consider the expected consumption rate of the popular content when the first-
content becomes popular. A user of type 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, finds a popular content that
matches her taste with probability 3
4
. Meanwhile, a user of type 1 < x ≤ 2 consumes
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one of the popular contents with a probability y 3
4
. Finally, a user finds at least a single
content to consume with probability 1 − 1
4
y. Since there are two popular contents
























































(3− 2y), κp = 3(1+y)4(4−y) and κf =
1+2y−2y2
6−7y+2y2 , the popular provider’s participa-
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The revenue function is strictly decreasing in y; y∗ = 0. The rest of the proof is
similar to the licensing case.
5.3 Revenue-Sharing Contract Without Price Commitment
When the popular provider is present and the platform’s production succeeds s∗ = 3
4
and all users join D(s∗) = 1. Otherwise, given r, the results derived in Lemma 3.2
apply. If the popular provider is not present, the subscription fee subgame follows
that of the licensing contract. In the first stage, given φ, the platform must choose
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the mix of providers to invite to join the platform. If the platform chooses to invite
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rκp + (1− φ)κf
(3− 2y − r(2− y))(2− y)
4(1− y)(2− r − y)
((2 + r)y2 − 7y + 2(3− r))2
4(2− r − y)
≥ θ
where κf =
2 + 3y − 6y2 + 2y3 − r (2− y2)











The platform’s optimal choice of r and y depends on the relationship between pro-
duction success probability parameter (φ) and the popular provider’s outside option
(θ). The popular provider’s expected revenue is concave in r and has a local max-
imum. Note a high r results in a high subscription fee in the subscription pricing
subgame. Therefore, a high r is detrimental to the total revenue generated and, con-
sequently, the provider’s share of the revenue. Given φ, if θ ≤ θr(φ), there exists
a unique r(y) that satisfies the popular provider’s participation constraint. Given
r∗(φ, θ) and y∗(φ, θ), the platform chooses to invite the popular provider if and only
if her expected profit in the presence of the popular content is weakly greater than her
expected profit in the absence of the popular content. Given the first stage subgame
equilibrium strategies (r∗(φ, θ) and y∗(φ, θ)), in stage zero, the platform chooses φ∗
that maximizes her expected revenue. We numerically observe that compared with
the coordinated market, its is optimal for the platform to invite the popular provider
for smaller ranges of c and θ. For larger values of θ, the platform invests more in the
production of first-party content. Moreover, for higher values of θ, the platform in-
vites significantly fewer niche providers to increase the rate of consumption of popular
content and mitigate the negative effects of the high royalty fee.
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5.4 Mechanism Comparison
The comparison between the revenue allocation rules highlights three main results. 1)
Similar to the base model, if commitment is not feasible, the licensing contract coor-
dinates the market, and if commitment is feasible, both revenue-sharing and licensing
contracts can coordinate the market. 2) The platform’s investment in producing first-
party content increases the expected revenue of the market, regardless of the presence
of the popular provider. The amount of investment, however, depends on the price
of the popular content. The platform invests significantly more in producing first-
party content, if it allows her to attract the popular provider. 3) If price commitment
is not feasible, with revenue-sharing the platform invests more in the production of
first-party content but is worse off in terms of the expected revenue generated.
(a) Coordinated Market (b) Revenue-Sharing without
Price Commitment
Figure 3·2: Platform’s optimal content-mix strategy as a function of
popular provider’s outside option θ and the platform’s production cost
c.
Figure 3·2 graphs the platform’s optimal content-mix strategy as a function of
model parameters c and θ with and without price commitment. In a coordinated
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market (Figure 3·2a), the platform’s optimal content-mix includes a large pool of
niche contents, but the presence of the popular content, depends on the production
cost of the platform and the outside option of the popular provider, such that the




. In effect, compared
to the base model, in the presence of first-party content production, the platform is
able to afford higher prices demanded by the popular provider. This is because users
with an unfavorable taste for niche contents value the bundle of the third-party and
first-party popular content more than a single popular content. Therefore, by inviting
the popular provider and investing in its own content the platform attract more users
and generates more revenue. With revenue-sharing, when price commitment is not
feasible (Figure 3·2b), for mid-range values of c and θ, the platform’s optimal content-
mix policy is to include fewer niche contents in the bundle (i.e. y∗ > 0) to manipulate
the rate of consumption of popular content. Note with y∗ > 0 users with a favorable
taste for niche contents may not find a niche content to consume with probability y∗
and move on to sample the popular content. Therefore, as y∗ increases the expected
consumption of the popular content increases. Given higher consumption rates the
platform can afford to invite the popular provider with smaller royalty fees. As shown
in Figure 3·3, as θ and c increase, y∗ increases, indicating that the higher is the cost
of popular content acquisition, the fewer niche contents are present on the platform.
However, as evident in Figure 3·2b and Figure 3·3, for small values of θ and c the
platform invites all niche providers to join. Note, the smaller the y∗, the more niche
providers are present on the platform.
To measure the relative performance of the revenue-sharing contract without price
commitment compared to a coordinating contract from the perspective of the plat-
form, we compute the ratio of the optimal expected profit under the two mechanisms.
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Figure 3·3: Platform’s optimal content-mix strategy as a function of
popular provider’s outside option θ and the platform’s production cost
c.
out price commitment becomes. As shown in Figure 3·4, the contract inefficiency is
increasing in the outside option θ. However, smaller production cost of the platform
mitigates the negative effect of popular provider’s higher outside option. This can be
explained as follows. With a smaller production cost, the platform can invest more
to ensure the success of its production and increase the expected surplus generated
from the bundling of her popular content with the third-party popular content. The
greater investment allows the platform to 1) satisfy the popular provider’s partici-
pation constraint with a smaller royalty fee, and 2) to invite all niche providers to
join, both of which ensures that the pricing and market size remain comparable to


























Figure 3·4: Ratio of Expected profit of the revenue - sharing contract
without price commitment to expected profit of the coordinated market,
as a function of popular provider’ s outside option θ at different values
of production cost c.
The platform’s optimal investment decision φ can be seen in Figure3·5. For small
values of θ (θ = 0.01 in Figure 3·5), the platform’s optimal investment decision is
analogous to that of a coordinated market. However, as θ increases the platform
invests more in producing its own content to be able to afford the provider’s outside
option.
6 Extensions
6.1 Positive Outside Options of Niche Providers
In this section, we extend the analysis by allowing niche content providers to have
a positive outside option. Suppose there exists a large pool of niche providers. The















Figure 3·5: Platform’s optimal investment parameter φ with the
revenue-sharing contract without price commitment as a function of
production cost c, at different values of θ
The Aggregator Platform
In the absence of the popular provider, in the second stage, given the presence of
n niche providers, the platform’s optimal subscription fee equals s∗ = 1 − y and
D(s∗) = 1
2
. In the first stage, the platform’s optimal choice of y is the argument
that maximizes her expected revenue, given that the niche provider’s participation










The platform’s profit function is concave in y and is maximized at y∗ = 2a, where
a = − θl
log(1−p) .
In the presence of the popular content provider, the positive outside option does
not affect the pricing strategy of the platform in the final stage, as described in Lemma
3.1 and Lemma 3.2. Under licensing, in the second stage, given the presence of the
popular provider, the platform’s optimal strategy y∗ is the argument that maximizes
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s.t. 0 ≤ y ≤ 1
2
For small enough values of θl, the platform’s expected revenue has a local maxima at
y∗, where y∗ is the first root of polynomial 4y3 − 8(1 + 2a)y2 + (3 + 32a)y − 16a = 0.
Finally, given y∗, the platform makes an offer θ to the popular provider to join if and
only if (3−2y
∗)2
16(1−y∗) + a log(y
∗) ≥ 1
2
(1− 2a) + a log(2a).
Under revenue sharing, in the final stage, given revenue sharing parameters r and
















































κ and κl denote the share of the consumption of the popular content and niche
contents on the platform, respectively. The platform’s revenue function is concave in
s and has a local maxima at s∗ =
6−7y+2y2−r(2−y2)−rl(4−7y+3y2)
4(2−r−y−rl(1−y))
. In the first stage, the
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It is intuitive that licensing coordinates the market while revenue-sharing without
price commitment does not. Furthermore, y∗ is strictly increasing in θl under both
mechanisms, albeit with a larger marginal rate under revenue-sharing. As in the
case with the main analysis, the performance gap between the two mechanisms is
increasing in θ. Interestingly, our numerical experiments show that for a given θ,












(a) θ = 0.03
Licensing
Revenue-sharing









(b) θ = 0.06
Figure 3·6: Platform’s optimal profit as a function of niche providers
outside option a, at different values of popular provider’s outside option
θ.
Hybrid Platform
We begin by analyzing the equilibrium in the absence of the popular provider. Upon
the realization of the outcome of platform’s production, if the first-party content is
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popular, the platform sets s∗ = 1
4
(3−2y), otherwise, s∗ = (1−y). In the second stage,









(1− y) + a log(y)
s.t. 0 ≤ y ≤ 1
2
The unique optimal y∗ depends on a and φ, and is the first root of 16a − y(16 +
32a− 13φ) + 8y2(4 + 2a− 3φ)− 4(4− 3φ)y3 = 0. Given y∗(φ), in the first period, the








(1− y∗(φ)) + a log(y∗(φ))− cφ2
The platform makes an offer to the popular provider if and only if θ is weakly smaller
than the surplus generated by her presence.
Under revenue sharing, when the popular provider is present and the first-party
content is realized to be popular, the platform’s optimal subscription fee is s∗ = 3
4
.
Given s∗, D(s∗) = 1, and all users join. The probability that a user finds a content to
consume equals 1− 1
4


















Meanwhile, if the production fails, the platform’s optimal subscription fee is described




























































6− 7y + 2y2 − r (2− y2)− rl (4− 7y + 3y2)
4 (2− r − y − rl(1− y))
.
Figure 3·7 displays the numerical comparisons of the platform’s expected earning
under licensing and revenue-sharing in the presence of first-party content production.
Similar to the base model, when the outside option of the niche providers is positive,
licensing coordinates the market. Under licensing, y∗ is independent of the outside
option of the popular provider, and is strictly increasing in the outside option of
niche providers. However, under revenue-sharing without price commitment, y∗ is
increasing in both niche providers’ outside option θl and the popular provider’s outside
option θ (Figure 3·8a).
Licensing
Revenue-Sharing










Figure 3·7: Platform’s optimal expected revenue as a function of niche




Finally, similar to the main analysis, with licensing, for values of θ where the
optimal choice of the platform is to invite the popular provider to join, the optimal
investment is independent of the outside options of the providers. However, with
revenue-sharing, the platform’s optimal investment is nonmonotone in a; namely, it
is initially decreasing and then increasing (see Figure 3·8b).
Licensing
Revenue-Sharing: θ = 0.03
Revenue-Sharing: θ = 0.06











Revenue-Sharing: θ = 0.03
Revenue-Sharing: θ = 0.06













Figure 3·8: Platform’s optimal mass of niche contents y∗ and invest-
ment in first-party content parameter φ as a function of niche providers




In this paper we study the coordination problem of video-streaming platforms under
two prevalent revenue allocation practices: revenue-sharing and licensing. Video-
streaming platforms such as Netflix aggregate contents from many providers and
offer the bundle for a fixed fee. The platform collects the revenue generated from
the subscription fees and allocates a portion of the revenue amongst providers. The
platform may choose to distribute the revenue amongst providers proportional to the
rate of consumption of their content (revenue-sharing) or a fixed lump-sum (licens-
ing). We show when the providers are heterogeneous in their quality and popularity
amongst users, revenue-sharing does not coordinate the market. The reason is that
the platform is inclined to manipulate the consumption rate of the popular content
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to decrease the payment to the popular providers. However, we show that if the plat-
form commits to a subscription fee, the revenue-sharing contract can coordinate the
market. Furthermore, we find licensing is able to coordinate the market, because the
platform pre-commits to a payment to the providers before setting the subscription
fee. Finally, we study the platform’s investment in the risky production of first-
party content. We show investing in first-party content allows the platform to attract
providers and users. We show, the platform invests more aggressively, to be able to
attract the popular provider to join the platform.
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7.1 Correlated Tastes for Niche Contents
Consider a bundle of niche contents 1, 2, . . . j, . . . , N , witch zero marginal costs, avail-
able on the platform. When a user arrives, she randomly chooses a content to sample.
If the content matches her taste, she consumes it and leave, otherwise, she moves on
to the next content and repeats the process until she has sampled all contents. The
user consumes content j if it matches her taste while all contents tested earlier do not.
The user does not match with a content with an unconditional probability of q = 1−p
and each pair of contents have a pairwise failure correlation of ρ. Intuitively, as the
user samples more and more content without being matched, the conditional proba-
bility with which she will be matched with the next content she samples decreases.
Furthermore, we assume the failure correlation between content j+1 and content j+2
remains equal to ρ regardless of the number of failed tries among the j contents the
user has already sampled. Define zj to be a random variable, representing the user’s
taste for content j after she has sampled it, where zj = 1, denotes that the content
has not matched with the user’s taste. Suppose the user has not been matched with
the last n−1 contents she has sampled, then the conditional probability that she will
not be matched with content n is written as:
qn = E (zn|z1 = 1, z2 = 1, . . . , zn − 1 = 1)
The pairwise correlation ρ and the unconditional failure probability q, imply q1 =
q, q2 = q + (1 − q)ρ and qn can be computed sequentially and equals qn = 1 − (1 −
q)(1 − ρ)n−1. Therefore, the conditional probability of N failures ( the probability
that the user cannot find a content, that matches her taste, to consume) in a bundle
of N niche content equals:
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Figure 3·9 simulates P [N ] as a function of N and ρ. As shown, when ρ = 0,
P [N ] = qN , which is analogous to the base model. As, ρ increases, however, the
probability that the user is not matched with any content increases. In other words,
with greater values of ρ, the more the user samples contents and does not find a
content that matches her taste, the less likely it is that she will not find such a content
with more sampling. Therefore, it is intuitive that the greater the ρ, the smaller the
user’s expected utility from joining the platform and the smaller the subscription
fee that the platform can charge. Also, the marginal benefit of the presence of the



















Figure 3·9: P [N ] as a function of N and ρ, q = 0.95
7.2 Non-Identical and Independent Tastes for Niche Contents
Suppose, the user’s probability of being matched for contents available in the bundle
is a sequence of independent Bernoulli trials and assume that the probability that the
ith content is matched with the user’s taste is exponentially decreasing in i, with a
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factor λ. The user is aware of her preference ranking and λ and searches the bundle for
a content that matches her taste, optimally. Given a bundle of size N , the probability
that the user finds a content that matches her taste equals:




























Figure 3·10: Probability of at least one success as a function of N
and λ, p = 0.05
Figure 3·10 compares the probability of at least one success given different values
for λ. It is intuitive that as λ gets larger, then the user is likely to be matched with
fewer contents available on the platform. In the case of rapidly declining preferences,
the platform is strictly worse off with a bundling business model, compared to selling
the contents individually. However, when λ is small and the probability of success of
subsequent contents decreases but slowly, then a large bundle of content can almost
surely guarantee that a user finds a content to consume. Therefore, for small values of




First-Party Bias in Media Streaming
Platforms
1 Introduction
An important function of most video streaming platforms is the integration of sophis-
ticated search engines and recommendation systems that provide users with personal-
ized content recommendations. From the users’ perspective, personalized recommen-
dation systems make the content search process convenient and less time-consuming.
Often, streaming services carry a large number of content in their libraries, and recom-
mendation services offer an opportunity to expose users to content that best matches
their tastes amongst many alternatives. Therefore, a large user segment of such plat-
forms relies on the recommendation of engines to choose what content to consume.
For example, according to reports published by Netflix, 75% – 80% of viewer activity
on its platform is influenced by its recommendation algorithm1.
However, the goal of a platform’s recommendation algorithm is not necessarily to
maximize its users’ utility through recommending the most relevant content. Instead,
the platform may be inclined to steer users toward consuming a content with the ob-
jective of increasing the overall profitability of the platform. The incentive of the
platform to manipulate its recommendation algorithm is even higher when the plat-
form offers first-party content. Specifically, the platform may opt to bias its advice
1How Netflix Uses Analytics To Select Movies, Create Content, and Make Multimillion Dollar
Decisions [Internet]. Available from: https://blog.kissmetrics.com/how-netflix-uses-analytics/.
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in favor of its own content, rather than those of third-party providers. For example,
Netflix’s algorithm recommended House of Cards, its first production hit, to most of
its users, regardless of their personal preferences and past behavior2. Own-content
recommendation bias is not limited to media streaming platforms. Google and Ama-
zon, for instance, were investigated for using their search engines to promote their own
products (De Corniere and Taylor, 2019). The downside to promoting own content is
lower service quality. Specifically, Bourreau and Gaudin (2018) show that users, aware
of the platform’s recommendation bias, consider the accuracy of recommendations;
and as a result, their willingness to pay for the service will be lower. Therefore, plat-
forms face a trade-off between maximizing their profit from the consumption of more
profitable content, and increasing demand by ensuring a higher quality of service.
The purpose of this paper is to explore the design of personalized recommendation
services and the interaction with the users’ search amongst alternative options. Our
specific research questions are as follows.
• How does the design of recommendation services affects users’ optimal search
behavior?
• How do the users’ search costs affect the platform’s optimal recommendation
strategy?
• How does the exogenous third-party provider’s royalty fee affects the platform’s
recommendation strategy?
Consistent with the body of work on information intermediaries and search engine
bias in economics (Hagiu and Jullien, 2011; Armstrong and Zhou, 2011), we define




user away from their ideal content. We develop a game-theoretical model featur-
ing one platform, one third-party content provider, and users. The platform offers
two vertically differentiated contents, one supplied by the platform and the other
by the third-party provider, in a bundle to users for a subscription fee. Users are
heterogeneous in their preferences for the two contents. We use a similar design for
consumer search as that of Armstrong et al. (2009). Namely, we consider users a
priori have imperfect information about their preferences for each content available
on the platform and realize their valuation by sequentially sampling the content at
a cost. Furthermore, we consider that users sample the first content at no cost, but
incur a search cost if they choose to sample the second content. We examine a setting
where the platform has perfect information about a user’s valuation for each product
and provides a personalized recommendation to each user. In practice, sophisticated
recommendation systems learn about a user’s preferences based on 1) the user’s view-
ing history and how the user rated other contents, 2) viewing history of other users
with similar tastes and preferences and 3) information about the contents, such as
genre, categories, actors, release year, etc3. This allows the platform to gain precise
information about users’ preferences for new content. The platform may manipulate
the search process by steering users to the first-party content. Our model sheds light
on how revenue-sharing structures and users’ strategic response to the personalized
recommendations they receive, determine platforms’ strategic design of personalized
recommendation services provided to their users.
A strategic user observes the platform’s recommendation and samples the recom-
mended content at no cost. She realizes her valuation for the content, and updates
her belief about her valuation for the alternative content, accordingly. Given her
updated belief, the user may choose to sample the alternative content for a cost.
Therefore, the platform’s optimal recommendation strategy incorporates the strate-
3https://help.netflix.com/How Netflix’s Recommendations System Works
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gic user’s searching behavior. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper
that incorporates users’ learning and search behavior in designing a platform’s opti-
mal recommendation strategy. We find that the dynamics of users search behavior in
the presence of recommendation bias, impacts the platform’s optimal strategy such
that 1) the platform’ strategic bias in favor of first-party content is weakly increasing
in the users’ search cost and the third-party provider’s royalty rate; 2) the platform’s
revenue is weakly decreasing in the third-party provider’s royalty rate, but weakly
increasing in the user’s search cost; 3) social welfare is weakly decreasing in the plat-
form’s recommendation bias.
2 Literature Review
This paper relates to literature on personalized recommendation systems. There is a
large body of literature that focuses on the technical aspects of developing personal-
ized recommendation systems that maximize users’ probability of purchase (see Gaur
and Liu (2020) for a recent overview). A few papers have focused on developing rec-
ommendation algorithms with the objective to maximize the platform’s profit instead
of user’s purchasing probability (Choi and Mela, 2019; Choudhary and Zhang, 2019;
Dinerstein et al., 2018). Most recently, Zhou and Zou (2021) study a marketplace
that recommends products which lead to the highest expected profit. They show that
in such settings, third-party sellers are incentivized to adjust their prices to compete
for recommendations, which, ultimately results in decreasing the platform’s profit.
However, there is limited understanding of how a user’s search behavior is affected
when the recommendation is designed to maximize the platform’s profit and not the
user’s utility. As such, our paper extends this literature by investigating the effects
of recommendation systems on users’ search behavior and market outcome.
Our work relates to the literature on information intermediaries. In many settings,
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similar to streaming platforms, service providers have access to more information than
their customers. As such, prior work has investigated the intermediary’s choice to
disclose information or recommendations that affect buyers’ behavior. Hagiu and
Jullien (2011) study an online intermediary’s search diversion strategy. They show
that an intermediary has an incentive to lower the quality of their recommendation
in exchange for higher revenues. They also identify conditions under which search
diversion is not beneficial to the intermediary. However, they assume that, if users
choose to participate (i.e., subscribe), they always follow the recommended action of
the intermediary. In this paper, however, we consider users to be strategic in their
response to content recommendations, and study how the design of the recommen-
dation systems is influenced by users’ search behavior. Papanastasiou et al. (2018)
study the intermediary’s optimal information provision design and show that partial
information structures can maximize aggregate consumer surplus by influencing the
purchasing decisions of users. Other papers in the economic literature have looked at
“intermediation bias”, as the intermediary platform’s choice to utilize its technology
to “direct” user behavior. De Corniere and Taylor (2019) study the determinants of
intermediation bias and its consequences. They consider a vertically-integrated inter-
mediary that biases its recommendation in favor of its subsidiary seller at the expense
of third-party sellers. Hagiu et al. (2020) studies the case of Amazon and show how
the platform may engage in preferencing its own product through its recommendation
system which effectively damages third-party sellers and raises antitrust concerns.
This work also complements the broader strand of literature that studies the the
design and optimization of two-sided digital goods platforms. Hagiu and Wright
(2015) study the trade-offs faced by a two-sided intermediary that facilitates trans-
actions between buyers and sellers and must choose to operate as a marketplace or a
reseller. Other papers explore the implications of specific contract forms in the selling
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of digital content (e.g. the agency model and wholesale contracts (Johnson, 2017))
and which channel to buy or sell from (e.g. content providers decision to sell a la carte
or via subscription (Lei and Swinney, 2018)). Feldman et al. (2019) study whether
food-delivery platforms are beneficial to restaurants. Bimpikis et al. (2020) examine
the mechanisms through which information design on supply-side decisions increases
platform revenues. The current paper considers a two-sided platform setting, but
the focus is on the implications of the design of personalized recommendation sys-
tems for the user side of the market. In investigating these implications, we model
users as strategic agents who make their own content choice, and we show that the
design of personalized recommendations can help the platform increase its revenues
by influencing the users’ search behavior. Finally, our paper also broadly relates to
the literature on the bundle and subscription business model. Cachon and Feldman
(2011) demonstrate that users become less price sensitive when considering a series
of consumption opportunities rather than considering them individually. Therefore,
subscription pricing is capable of extracting more revenue from customers than peruse
pricing. Lei and Swinney (2018) show inducing high quality content provider to join
a subscription platform is challenging and costly, because a revenue-sharing contract
cannot compensate high quality creators for their contribution to consumer utility.
3 Model Description
A monopolist platform offers two contents in a bundle, one supplied by herself (de-
noted f) and one supplied by a third-party provider (denoted t), for a fixed fee s.
There are a continuum of users with a total mass normalized to one. Each user
wishes to consume one content from the bundle. Nature draws each user’s value for
each content, randomly, from a uniform distribution on the interval [0, 1]. Prior to
subscribing to the bundle, users have imperfect information about their valuation for
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each content and sequentially sample the contents to learn their value. They pay a
search cost c to sample a content and can only consume a content they have sampled.
Moreover, we assume users costlessly return to consume a content that best matches
their tastes after they have sampled both contents. This assumption is generally im-
posed in the consumer search literature (Armstrong et al., 2009). Note that, ex ante,
users do not have any preference for either content and believe their valuation for
the first- and the third-party contents (i.e. vf and vt, respectively) to be uniformly
and randomly distributed on the interval [0, 1]. Therefore, their optimal strategy is
to compare the value they observe from the first content they sample to a reservation
value. If the observed value is below the reservation value they sample the second
content and if the observed value is above the reservation value, they stop sampling
and consume the first content (Weitzman, 1979). Furthermore, we assume that the
sampling a recommended content is costless to users. For example, when the platform
recommends a content to a user, it provides valuable information (otherwise costly)
about the content without any search costs. We note that this assumption simplifies
the analysis but does not derive the results and can comfortably be relaxed. Finally,
we assume that the search cost is small enough that users want to participate in the
market.
Suppose the platform has full information with respect to a user’s valuation for
either content. Therefore, the platform may choose to provide a personalized rec-
ommendation to her. The user is aware of the platform’s recommendation strategy
and may choose to follow the recommendation and consume the recommended con-
tent without sampling the second one; or ignore the recommendation and sample
the second content at a cost c. The rational user chooses the option that maximizes
her utility. Given an exogenous royalty rate r, the platform pays a share of the net




4.1 Benchmark: Absence of Recommendation
We begin our analysis of the market in the absence of a recommendation system. In
the absence of a recommendation system, a user resolves her valuation uncertainty
upon sampling a content. Upon paying the subscription fee and joining the platform,
the user randomly chooses one of the two contents to sample. Upon realizing her
value, she may choose to consume the content or sample the alternative content at a
cost c; in this case, she subsequently consumes the content with the highest realized
value. First, we characterize the user’s optimal search rule. Suppose a user realizes
the value of the first content she samples to be ṽ1. Then her expected gain from
sampling the alternative content is
∫ 1
ṽ1
(v2 − ṽ1)f(v2)dv2 = 12 +
1
2
ṽ21 − ṽ1. She samples
the content if this expected gain is weakly greater than the search cost she must







V 2 − V = c⇔ V = 1−
√
2c
Therefore the optimal search policy is such that the user compares her realized
value ṽ1 with her reservation value V : she samples the alternative content if ṽ1 < V ;
otherwise, she stops and consumes the first content immediately.









































8c3). The net generated revenue equals s∗. The probability that the third-












and leaves the rest to the third-party provider.
4.2 Benchmark: Neutral Recommendation
Consider the benchmark case where there exists no recommendation bias. The plat-
form recommends f to a user if her value for the first-party content is weakly greater
than that of the third-party content (i.e. vf ≥ vt) and t, otherwise. Users are rational
and fully aware of the platform’s recommendation strategy. Therefore, they consume
the content that the platform recommends to them. A user’s expected utility from















The platform’s optimal subscription fee is to extract all user’s surplus (i.e. s∗ = 2
3
).
Users join the service and consume the content that is recommended to them. The net
generated revenue equals s∗. The probability that the first-party content is consumed





1 dvf dvt =
1
2
. Subsequently, the probability that the third-
party content is consumed equals 1
2








leaves the rest to the third-party provider. A neutral recommendation system relays
the platform’s private information to the users, enabling the platform to extract the
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whole surplus generated from the bundle.
4.3 Biased Recommendation
Suppose the platform adopts a recommendation strategy such that the platform rec-
ommends the first-party content to a user if vf ≥ vt + β ( as depicted in Figure 4·1).
Thus, for a β > 0, the platform recommends her own content to a user whose value
for the third-party content is vt ≤ vf − β. Suppose a user joins the service, receives
a recommendation t, samples the content t and realizes her value ṽt. Recall that
we assume a user realizes her valuation of the recommended content without incur-
ring any cost. She updates her belief about her valuation of the first-party content
(vf ) such that v
u
f ∼ U [0, ṽt − β]. Note the upper limit of the user’s valuation for
the first-party content equals ṽt − β and is strictly smaller than ṽt. Therefore, the
user’s does not expect any gain from sampling the first-party content, and follows the
recommendation of the platform and consumes the third-party content.
β











Figure 4·1: The platform’s biased recommendation strategy
Now suppose a user who receives a recommendation f and samples the f content.
She realizes her value to be ṽf and updates her belief about vt such that:
• If 1 − β ≤ ṽf ≤ 1, vut ∼ U [0, 1]. Therefore, the platform’s recommendation of
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the first-party content does not provide any additional information about her
valuation of the third-party content.
• If 0 ≤ ṽf < 1− β, vut ∼ U [0, ṽf + β].
Consequently, a user who receives a recommendation f and her realized value of
the first-party content is such that ṽf ≥ 1− β, samples the third-party content if her
realized value is less than or equal her reservation value, denoted by x. Note that x is
the value for which the expected gain from sampling the third-party content equals
the user’s search cost, and is the solution to the equality:
1∫
x
(vt − x) dvt = c⇔ x = 1−
√
2c (4.2)
Given her reservation value x = 1 −
√
2c, a user with a realized value ṽf , where,
1− β ≤ ṽf , samples the second content if β >
√
2c and ṽf < 1−
√
2c.
Meanwhile, a user who receives a recommendation f and her realized value of the
first-party content is such that 0 ≤ ṽf < 1−β, samples the third-party content if her
realized value is less than or equal her reservation value, denoted by X. Where X
denotes the value for which the expected gain from sampling the third-party content
equals the search cost and is the solution to the following equation:
X+β∫
X




















2c. Therefore, a user who receives
a recommendation f , samples the third-party content if her realized value is ṽf <
1−
√
2c. Intuitively, when the recommendation system is heavily biased toward the
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first-party content (i.e. β >
√
2c), the user finds it optimal to search the third-party









2c. Therefore, if 2c < β ≤
√
2c, and a user




and consumes the content with the highest realized value. Finally, if β ≤ 2c, the user
does not find it worthwhile to sample the third-party content at a cost c, regardless
of her realized value ṽf and consumes the first-party content. Intuitively, when the
recommendation system is only slightly biased toward the first-party content, the
user’s expected gain from sampling the third-party content does not compensate her
for the search cost she must incur.
Let us first consider the users’ expected utility from subscribing to the bundle for


























The first two expressions in the user’s expected utility denotes the her expected
value from consuming the first-party content when vf and vt are such that the platform
recommends f (i.e. vf ≥ max (vt − β, 0)). The third expression in the user’s expected
utility denotes the user’s expected value from consuming the third-party content if
her vf and vt are such that the platform recommends t (i.e. vt > vf + β). Given
the users’ expected utility from subscribing to the bundle, the platform’s optimal






β3 and extract all surplus. Note that for
any value of 0 < β ≤ 2c, the price of the bundle is less than the benchmark with the
neutral recommendation. This is because the user expects a lower utility from joining
a service with a biased recommendation system. Finally, the share of consumption of
123























and leaves the rest
to the third-party provider. Next, we consider the case where 2c < β <
√
2c, in which
case a user with a realized value ṽf ≤ X, where X = β(β−2c)2c , samples the third-party
content at a cost c, and consumes the content with the highest realized value. Given
the users’ optimal search strategy, we write the expected utility from subscribing to












































The first two expressions denote the expected value from consuming the first-party
content, where vf and vt are such that the user receives a recommendation f and
consumes the first-party content without sampling the third-party content. The third
expression denotes the expected value given the user samples the third-party content,
but goes back to consuming the first content. The forth expression denotes the
expected value when vf and vt are such that the user receives a recommendation
t and consumes the third-party content. While, the fifth expression denotes the
expected value from consuming the third-party content, only if the user receives a
recommendation f , but samples the third-party content and realized that her value
for the third-party content is greater than that of the first-party content. Finally, the
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last expression denotes the probability that the user realizes a value vf , upon getting
a recommendation f such that her best course of action is to sample the third-party
content for a cost c.
Given the user’s expected utility from subscribing to the bundle, the platform’s






β2(1 − c) + β4
8c
and all surplus











1 dvt dvf =
1
2
(1− β)2 + β
2(β − 2c)
2c




















and leaves the rest to the third-
party provider.
Finally, if β is such that β >
√
2c, a user who receives a recommendation to
consume the first-party content, and ṽf < 1−
√
2c, samples the third-party content.



















































The first expression denotes the users’ expected value from consuming the first-party
content, when vf and vt are such that the user receives a recommendation f , and
consume the first-party content, immediately. While, the second expression denotes
the expected value from consuming the first-party content, when a user receives a
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recommendation f , and after realizing her value to be less than x, chooses to sample
the third-party content. The third expression denote the expected value from con-
suming the third-party content, given the user receives a recommendation t. While,
the fourth and fifth expressions, denote the expected value from consuming the third-
party content when the user receives a recommendation f , samples the third-party
content and realized her value for the third-party content to be greater than that of
the first-party content. Finally, the last two expressions denote the probability that
the user realizes a value vf , upon getting a recommendation f such that her best
course of action is to sample the third-party content for a cost c.
Given the user’s expected utility from subscribing to the bundle, the platform’s










− βc and all surplus






















The platform chooses β∗ that maximizes the expected revenue, given the users’
optimal search policy and the optimal subscription fee (s∗(β)), induced by the plat-




Where κ(β) denotes the expected consumption rate of the third-party content given
β.
Proposition 4.1. A biased recommendation system recommends the first-party con-
tent to a user if vf ≥ vt − β∗ and, the the second-party content, otherwise. For a
search cost c there exists a unique threshold (cth) such that:
i If c ≤ cth, when r ≤ 6c(1−2c)2−5c−24c2+68c3−56c4 , β
∗ satisfies β∗ ≤ 2c, and each user
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consumes the recommended content. When r > 6c(1−2c)
2−5c−24c2+68c3−56c4 , β
∗ satisfies
2c < β∗ <
√
2c, and a user who receives an f recommendation samples the third-




ii If c > cth, β
∗ satisfies β∗ ≤ 2c, and each user consumes the recommended content.
Proposition 4.1 suggests that the platform’s optimal bias toward first-party con-
tent depends on the magnitude of the users’ search cost, and the third-party provider’s
royalty rate. The result is illustrated in Figure 4·2. Observe that given a small search
cost c, the optimal β∗ increases in r. The platform initially opts to set β∗ such that
the users take the platform’s recommendation and do not sample the alternative. As
r increases, the platform gradually shifts its strategy toward allowing some users to
sample the third-party content, given a recommendation f .












Figure 4·2: The platform’s Optimal recommendation strategy as a
function of c and r
Proposition 4.2 establishes that the price of the bundle and therefore, the total
social welfare generated from the bundle, is decreasing in c and r. The proposition
suggests that when search is costly, a biased recommendation may induce some users
to sample the alternative content at a high cost. Therefore, the value of the bundle
decreases for the users, forcing the platform to charge lower prices.
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Proposition 4.2. The price of the bundle is non-monotonically decreasing in the
user’s search cost and the third-party provider’s royalty rate.
We now consider how the design of a biased personalized recommendation service
affects the platform’s and the third-party provider’s expected profit as compared to
the benchmarks. With the adoption of biased recommendation system, the platform
is able to steer consumption to increase its own revenue at the cost of lower third-party
provider’s revenue and social welfare. As the royalty rate of the third-party provider
increases, the platform becomes more aggressive in steering users to consuming first-
party content. However, the strategy is most effective when users incur high costs to




























(b) c = 0.3
Figure 4·3: Platform’s optimal revenue parameter a function of the
third-party provider’s royalty rate.
As illustrated in Figure 4·4, when search cost is sufficiently small, the revenue
of the third-party provider is strictly increasing in r. Intuitively, a small search
cost hinders the platform’s attempt to steer users to first-party content. Namely,
a strategic user with small search cost samples the third-party content, even if the
platform recommends the first-party content to her. Therefore, the provider is strictly
better off with higher royalty rates to extract its share of the revenue. However, when
the search cost is high, it becomes easier for the platform to steer users to the first-
party content. Taking into account that the platform’s bias is increasing in r and
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that the price of the bundle is decreasing in r, the third-party provider’s revenue is
first increasing and then decreasing in r. This implies that the third-party provider
































(b) c = 0.3
Figure 4·4: Revenue of the third-party provider as a function of the
third-party provider’s royalty rate.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
This paper studies the optimal design of the recommendation system of an streaming
platform that has private information about users valuations and provides users with
personalized recommendations on what content to consume. We show that the plat-
form may utilize its recommendation system to steer users to consuming the content
provided by the platform. Users take the recommendation of the platform and choose
whether to consume the content or continue sampling to find the content that best
matches their tastes. We show a linearly-biased recommendation system allows the
platform to increase its revenue, albeit at the cost of lower social welfare.
When the search cost is sufficiently small, under the optimal recommendation
strategy, some users may choose to ignore the recommendation of the platform and
sample the alternative content. However, as the search cost increases the platform
is able to steer users toward first-party content more aggressively. Furthermore, we
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show that when the search cost is high, the third-party provider is better off with an
intermediate royalty rate.
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Proof of Proposition 4.1
Proof. First, let us consider the platform’s maximization problem where
√
2c ≤ β < 1
and a user samples the third-party content if she receives a recommendation f and






























2c ≤ β < 1















2c ≤ β < 1, β∗ =
√
2c. Next, we consider the platform’s



























s.t. 2c < β ≤
√
2c












































2−5c−24c2+68c3−56c4 < r ≤ 1, the second-order condition is satisfied, and the the
revenue function has a local maximum at β∗, where, β∗ is the implicit solution to
the first-order condition. However, if r < 6c(1−2c)
2−5c−24c2+68c3−56c4 , the function is strictly


















s.t. 0 ≤ β ≤ 2c
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If r < 6c
2+3c−18c2+20c3 , the function has a local maximum which is the implicit solution
to the first-order condition and that satisfies the second-order condition. However, if
r ≥ 6c
2+3c−18c2+20c3 , the function is strictly increasing in β and β
∗ = 2c. Comparing
the optimal revenue function given the users’ optimal search behavior, we have:
• If r < 6c
2+3c−18c2+20c3 , β























• If r > 6c(1−2c)
2−5c−24c2+68c3−56c4 , β


























When c is such that 6c
2+3c−18c2+20c3 > 1, given the optimal recommendation strategy


















(i.e. the second root of 4r−3(2−r)β−9rβ2 +5rβ3 = 0), and does not depend on the
user’s search cost c. If c is such that 6c
2+3c−18c2+20c3 ≤ 1 and
6c(1−2c)
2−5c−24c2+68c3−56c4 > 1,
for r < 6c
2+3c−18c2+20c3 , β
∗ is independent of c. However, if r ≥ 6c
2+3c−18c2+20c3 , β
∗ =
2c, is strictly increasing in c. Finally, if c is such that 6c(1−2c)
2−5c−24c2+68c3−56c4 < 1, we
have: 1) for r < 6c
2+3c−18c2+20c3 , β
∗ is independent of c; 2) for 6c
2+3c−18c2+20c3 ≤ r ≤
6c(1−2c)
2−5c−24c2+68c3−56c4 , β
∗ = 2c, is strictly increasing in c; 3) for 6c(1−2c)
2−5c−24c2+68c3−56c4 < r ≤


























, and is strictly increasing in c.
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Proof of Proposition 4.2
Proof. In the proof of Proposition 4.1, we establish that β∗, is non-monotonically
increasing in c. When r < 6c
2+3c−18c2+20c3 , β







β3, does not depend on c. However, β∗ is strictly increasing in
r and the price is strictly decreasing in β. Therefore, the price of the bundle is
decreasing in r.
When 6c(1−2c)
2−5c−24c2+68c3−56c4 < 1, for
6c(1−2c)
2−5c−24c2+68c3−56c4 < r ≤ 1, β
∗ is strictly in-









β2(1− c) + β4
8c
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β∗2 − (1− c)β∗ + β∗3
2c
< 0 and ∂β
∂c
> 0.












, and β∗ is increasing in r, the price
of the bundle is decreasing in r.
Finally, when 6c
2+3c−18c2+20c3 ≤ r ≤
6c(1−2c)
2−5c−24c2+68c3−56c4 and β
∗ = 2c, the price of the
bundle is decreasing in c, but independent of r.
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